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THE MAGIC OF DISAPPEARING WEALTH REVISITED: USING
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS TO REDUCE ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
Ronald H. Jensen"
Medieval alchemists strived to transmute base metals into gold. Today,
taxpayers seek a reverse transmutation: to reduce the value of their
property-at least when it is beingvalued for gift and estate tax purposes.
Taxpayers have achieved notable success in their quest by employing family
limited partnerships (FLPs).' Use of this entity has enabled taxpayers to
reduce the values that would otherwise be taxed by discounts generally
ranging from 25% to 35%.2 On occasion, even larger discounts have been
allowed.3 However, a recent case, Estate ofStrangi v. Commissioner,4 has
thrown considerable doubt on the continuing viability of this planning
* Professor ofLaw, Pace University SchoolofLaw. Iwould like to thank my colleague, Professor
Bridget Crawfurd, for her help and insightful cOmments and Shiobhan O'Grady for her excellent research
assistance. I am dedicating this article to the memory of Albert R. Mugel-scholar, teacher, lawyer, and
friend.
1. The same tax savings could also be achieved by using a limited liability company that has either
elected or acquiesced to be treated as a partnership for federal tax purposes. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3
(as amended in 2001). One commentatorhas therefore used the term "family limited liability entity" when
discussing the techniques and issues examined in this article. See generaUy WalterO. Schwidet1ky, Last-
Gasp Estate Planning: The Formation ofFamily LimitedLiability Entities Shortly Before Death, 21 VA.
TAX REV. I,passim (2001) (using the term ''family limited liability entity" throughout). However, this
article will use the more traditional term ''family limited partnership," or its abbreviation "FLP," since that
is the term commonly used in the literature, but with the understanding that the discussion in this article
also applies to limited liability companies.
2. KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION: STRATEGIES AND
SOLUTIONS' 16.03[I][c] (1997).
3. See, e.g., Estate of Oailey v. Comm'r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 710, 712, 2001 T.C.M. (RIA)
, 2001-263, at 1977 (allowing a 40% discount); Estate ofJones v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 121, 138-41 (2001)
(allowing a 45% discount); Estate of Harrison v. Comm'r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306, 1310,1987 T.C.M.
(P-H), 87,008, at41 (aUowinga 45% discount); Estate ofChurch v. United States, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH)
, 60,369, at 84,779-80 (W.O. Tex. 2000), affd, 268 F3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001)(allowing a 58% discount;
government presented no evidence on valuation).
4. Estate of Strangi v.Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) '2003-145
[hereinafter Strangi 11]. The taxpayer has appealed the decision. Rachel Emma Silverman, Popular Tool
for Estate Plans Under Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2003, at 01. The Tax Court had previously decided
the case in the taxpayer's mvor, but the Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision in part and
remanded the case. EstateofStrangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478 (2000), aff'd in part, rev 'd and remanded
in part sub nom. Gulig v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Strangi 1].
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technique.s .It is therefore an opportune time to reconsider the FLP-both in
terms of its continuing efficacy a~ an estate planning tool and the substantial
policy issues it raises.
Part I ofthis article will describe the techniques for using FLPs to reduce
gift and estate taxes. Part IT will discuss the economic validity of the
.discounts that are allowed under current law. Part III will examine the current
status of the law regarding FLPs. Finally, Part IV will discuss the need for
reform and will analyze and evaluate the various proposals for reform put
forth to date. Part IV will conclude with a new recommendation for curtailing
the abusive use of FLPs.
I. How TO USE FLPs TO REDUCE GIFT AND ESTATE TAXES
A. When Death Is Not Imminent
Ifdeath is notimminent, theplanwill normally be implemented along the
following lines: the taxpayer will transfer the assets she wishes to qualify for
discount to an FLP, taking back a general partnership (GP) interest
representing a minute portion of the FLP's equity (say, 1%) and limited
partnership (LP) interests representing the balance of the FLP's equity (say,
99%).6 The taxpayer will thenembark on a giftprogram designed to eliminate
all ofher LP interests at little or no gift tax cost. Thus, her estate at death will
consist ofonly a GP interest representing amere one percent of the FLP's
equity. The taxpayer may of course also give away the GP interest if she
wishes, thereby totally eliminating the FLP from her estate.
5. Louis A. Mezmllo,Is Strangi a Strange Result or a Blueprint/orFuture IRS Successes Against
FLPs, 99 J. TAX'N 45, 45 (2003) (stating that decision "could pose a substantial impediment to the
traditional design of FLPs for estate planning"); Elaine Hightower Gagliardi, Strangi III: Right Answer,
Wrong Reason? Or Just Plain Wrong?, 100 TAX NOTES 373, 373 (2003) (stating that U[s]ome attorneys
have questioned whether Strangi III summons the endofthe FLP as an estate planningtool" but others "hail
the opinion as providing guidelines foc the effective use ofthe FLP"); Susan Kalinka, Estate of Strangi D:
IRS Wins AnotherBattle in Its War AgainstFLPs, 100 TAX NOTES 545, 556 (2003) (stating that ifdecision
is aflinned, it will be difficult to obtain discounts unless FLP conducts an active business); Mitchell M.
Gans & Ionathan G. Blattmachr, Strangi: A Critical Analysisand Planning Suggestions, 100 TAX NOTES
11 53, 11 54 (2003) (stating that decision poses a"critical threat" to tax-saving potential ofFLPs but "can
be neutralized" ifproper steps taken).
6. Frequently, the taxpayer, instead of transfeiTing assets directly to the FLP in return for the OP
interest, will transfer them to alimited liability companyoracorporation ofwhich he is the sole owner, and
the entity will then transfer the assets to the FLP in exchange for the GP interest. This approach provides
the taxpayer with limited liability.
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What makes this approach appealing is that the LP interests will be
valued for tax purposes at a substantial discount from the value of the
underlying assets that they represent. The purported justification for these
discounts is that the LP interests lack both control and marketability. These
discounts will be discussed in more detail in the next section, but a brief
explanation of their rationale is appropriate here.
State law prohibits the limited partners ofan FLP from participating in
the management ofthe business.7 Consequently, a buyer ofan LP interest will
be at the mercy ofthe general partners with respect to all decisions regarding
the FLP's operations and earnings (e.g., whether the FLP distributes its
earnings to the partners or retains them in the business). Obviously, a buyer
will pay less for such an interest than he would for an interest that confers
control. This reduction is usually referred to as a discount for lack ofcontrol.8
Unlike stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange, LP interests in
a closely-held business are not traded on an active market. The owner of an
LP interest wishing to dispose of that interest cannot sell it simply by
telephoning her broker. To sell the interest, the limited partner must locate
7. Most states have enacted the Revised Unifonn Limited Partnership Act (RULPA) as adopted
by the National Conference ofCommissioners on Unifonn State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1976 or as amended
in 1985. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIPAcT, 6A U.L.A. 126, historical notes (2003), and the table of
jurisdictions that have adopted one or the other of these vmions. Id. at 125-26, tbl. Section 303 in both
versions provides that a limi ted partner who "in addi tion to the exercise of his [or her] rights and powers
as a limited partner ... participates in the control ofthe business" is liable for the partnership's obligations.
REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIPAcT § 303 and REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIPAcT § 303 (amended 1985), 6A
U.LA 324-25 (2003). This makes it clear that participation in the control of the business is beyond the
"rights and powers ... [of] a limited partner." Id.
In 2001, the NCCUSL adopted an entirely new RULPA. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIPAcT, 6A
U.1.A. 2-8, prefatory note (2003). Unlike its predecessors, section 303 of the 2001 version provides that
a limited partner is not liable for the partnership's obligations "even if the limited partner participates in
the management and control of the limited partnership." REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 303 (amended
2001), 6A U.LA. 46 (2003). However, the official Comment to section 302 states that a limited partner's
position is "analogous to a shareholder in a corporation; status as owner provides [no] right to manage."
REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT, 6A UL.A 45 cmt. (2003). This suggests that RULPA (2001)
contemplates that a limited partner will not participate in managing the partnership unless specifically
authorized to do so. However, prudence suggests that parties wishing to qualify an LP interest for a lack-()f-
control discount should specify in the partnmhip agreement that limited partners have no management
powers.
8. See general/ySHANNoN P. PRATT ET AL., VALUING ABUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND ApPRAISAL
OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 363·90 (4th ed. 2000); Alan L Feld, The Imp/ications ofMinority Interest
and Stock Restrictions in Valuing Closely-Held Shares, 122 U. PA. 1. REv. 934, 934-38 (1974); Mary
Louise Fellows & William H. Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes:
A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30 STAN. L. REV.895, 903 -16 (1978); James
R. Repetti, Minority Discounts: The Alchemy in EsUlte and Gift Taxation, 50TAX L. REV. 415, 423-31
(1995).
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potential buyers and convince one of them to buy it. This means providing a
potential buyer with financial statements and explaining to him the FLP's
business, its prospects for the future, its competition, and its management.
Since the buyer of the LP interest will have no say in the management of the
FLP,9 he will want to meet the general partner to evaluate his competency and
honesty and to determine ifthe general partner's plans for the business' future
are satisfactory. All ofthis requires time and effort, and time and effort mean
money. The rationale for allowing a discount for lack ofmarketability is that
a potential buyer will discount, that is, pay less for an interest that he cannot
readily resell.' 0
As stated above, courts have generally allowed combined discounts for
lack of marketability and control ranging from 25% to 35% and sometimes
even more. I , These discounts, when used in conjunction with the gift tax
annual exclusion12 and the gift tax unified credit,13 can result in very
substantial amounts of wealth being transferred without any transfer tax
liability.
Consider the following case. Father (F) and Mother (M) own equally an
unincorporated business worth $4,000,000. They have two children and four
grandchildren. The following plan will enable them to give virtually their
entire business away over a six year period without paying any transfer tax.
Step 1: F and M transfer their interests in the business to an FLP and each
takes back a GP interest representing 0.5% of the FLP's equity and LP
interests representing 49.5% of its equity. Assuming a combined lack-of-
control and lack-of-marketability discount of 30% for the LP interests and a
10% lack-of-marketabilitydiscount for the GP interests, the interests wi11 have
the values shown below:
9. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
10. See generally PRATT ET AL., supra note 8, at 391-423; Fenows & Painter, supra note 8, at
916-21.
11. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
12. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
13. [d. § 2505(a).
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Discount-
GP interest:
Value of 10% Value of
Partner's Percentage assets discount; interest
interest represented LP interest: after
by interest 30% discount discount
Mother's GP
interest 0.5% $20,000 $2,000 $18,000
Father's GP
interest 0.5% $20,000 $2,000 $18,000
Mother's LP
interest 49.5% $1,980,000 $594,000 $1,386,000
Father's LP
interest 49.5% $1,980,000 $594,000 $1,386,000
Total 100.0% $4,000,000 $1,192,000 $2,808,000
Step 2: M and F give away their LP interests to their children and
grandchildren. This can be accomplished over a six-year period without
paying any gift tax.
Gifts in Year 1: F and M each make gifts of $177,666 to each child and grandchild,
resulting in total gifts by each donor of$l ,065,996. These gifts are not taxable because
ofthe gift tax unified credit that shelters $1,000,000 from tax in the case ofeach donor'4
and each donor's annual gift tax exclusion of $1l,000 per donee. 15 [$1,000,000 +
14. Id. The amount that is sheltered from the gift tax is denominated as the "applicable exclusion
amount" in the current statute. See id.; see also id. § 2010(c).
15. Id. § 2503(b)(1); Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-2 C.B. 845, § 3.24(1) (inflation adjusted annual
exclusion for gifts made in 2003 is SII ,000). Whether LP interests in an FLP, as they are now generally
structured, will continue to qualify for the annual exclusion has been questioned in view ofthe Tax Court's
decision in Hackl v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 279 (2002), affd, 335 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2003). In that case,
the court disallowed the annual exclusion with respect to a limited liability company unit, because it fuund
that the unit did not confer a "present" economic benefit. Id. at 299. The court based this finding, inter
alia, on provisions in the operating agreement that prohibited a member from withdrawing his capital
contribution or selling or otherwise transferring his unit unless approved by the manager. Commentators
have suggested that the result in Hackl may be avoided by one or more of the following strategies:
(a) Allow the donee to sell his interest to outside parties, subject, however, to a right offrrst refusal
that would allow the entity or the other equity holders to buy the donee's interest on the same
terms and conditions as those in the outsider's ofter. See Steve R. Akers et aI., Valuation of
Closely-Held Business Interests for Federal Tax Purposes, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED.
TAX'N § 15.05[6][a] (2003); John W. Porter, Current Valuation Issues, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. INST.
ON FED. TAX'N § 24.05[7][f) (2003); Thomas S. Flickinger, Comment, Gifts ofFamily LLC
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($11,000 x 6 donees) = $1,066,000]. The combined gifts of F and M during Year I
amountto $2,131,992 [2 x $1,065,996].
Gifts in Years 2-5: F and M each make gifts of$II,OOO to each child and grandchild
during each year in this period, resulting in total gifts by each donor of $264,000
[$11,000 per year x 6 donees x 4 years]. These gifts are sheltered from tax by reason of
the annual exclusion. The combined gifts of F and M during Years 2-5 amount to
$528,000 [2 x $264,000].
Gifts in Year 6: F and M each make gifts of $9,334 to each child and grandchild,
resulting in total gifts during Year 6 of $112,008 [2 donors x $9,334 per donee x 6
donees]. Assuming that the values have remained constant over the six year period, F
andMwill have completely divested themselvesofLP interests. The gifts in Year 6 are
completely sheltered from gift tax by the annual exclusion.
Thus, F andM will have transferred LP interests representing 99% of the
FLP's equity, which is equivalent to $3,960,000 of value in the underlying
assets, completely free ofany gift tax" 6 Of this amount, $1,188,000 escaped
taxation by reason of the discounts.
This plan can be implemented regardless of which spouse holds title to
the property if the other spouse is willing to cooperate. If, for example, F
owned 100% of the business, the plan could still be implemented by having
F transfer 50% of the business to M and then proceeding as outlined above.
F s transfer to M would be tax free because of the unlimited gift tax marital
Units in a Post-Hackl Era: Present Interests or Future Interests?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 853, 862 (2003).
(b) Give the donee the right to require the entity, for a limited period (e.g., 90 days), to redeem his
interest for its fair market (i.e., its discounted) value (determined as though the put right did not
exist), or the amount of the annual exclusion, ifless. See Akers et aI., supra, § 15.05[6][c];
Porter, supra, § 24.06[7][f]; Flickinger, supra, at 862.
(c) Have the donor transfer cash, in an amount equal to the discounted value of the interest to be
transferred, to a defective grantor trust (i.e., a trust which the donor will be treated as "owning"
for income tax purposes) ofwhich the donee is the beneficiary, and then have the trust buy such
interest from the donor for its discounted value. See Akers, supra, § 15.05[6][b]; Flickinger,
supra, at 862.
16. The gifts over the six-year period are summarized below:
Amounts Explanation
$2,772,000 Value oflP interests after 30% discount
-2,131,992 Gifts in Year 1
-528,000 Gifts in Years 2-5
-1I2,008 Gifts in Year 6
-0- AlIlP interests given away without gift tax
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deduction. 17 Alternatively, the same result could be achieved by M's consent
to have one-half ofF's gifts treated as made by her. 18
B. When Death Is Imminent
Ifdeath is imminent, the plan described above will not be feasible, since
there will be no time for the taxpayer to "dribble out" his LP interests in a
string of annual gifts, each in the amount of the annual exclusion. Instead,
what is required is a plan that immediately converts the taxpayer's interest in
his property to a noncontrolling and difficult-to-market interest
The following plan, based on the facts of Estate of Strangi v.
Commissioner, 19 illustrates how this may be accomplished. Assume taxpayer
D has assets, in the form of cash and publicly traded securities, with a value
of $9,950,000. In the first step of the plan, D transfers $50,000 in cash or
securities to a newly formed corporation, Newco, in exchange for a 48% stock
interest in Newco. Concurrently, members ofD's family transfer $55,000 in
cash to Newco for a 52% stock interest. In the next step, D transfers assets
worth $9,900,000 to a newly-formed FLP in exchange for an LP interest
representing 99% ofits equity, while Newcotransfers $100,000 to the FLP in
exchange for a GP interest representing 1% ofits equity. The transactions are
graphically illustrated below:
17. I.R.C. § 2523(a).
18. Id. § 2513. .
19. Strangi I, liS T.C. 478 (2000), ajJ'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part sub nom. Gulig v.
Comm'r, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002).
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I DECEDENr I
n U D D









Notice what has happened. D started out with absolute control over
$9,950,000 ofassets. He ended up with minority interests in both Newco and
the FLP, thereby losing control of those assets. Instead of owning cash and
readily marketable securities,D ended up owning interests in two closelyheld
entities, which, like all closely held interests, will be difficult to market. D's
estate can now claim substantial discounts for both lack ofcontrol and lack of
marketability. In Strangi, the Service's own expert testified on facts similar
to those above that the LP interest should be discounted by 31 %.20 The Tax
Court grudgingly accepted this discount 21 Ifthis discount is used in the above
example, the $9,900,000 of assets that D transferred to the FLP would be
20. Id. at 491-92.
21. Id. at 492-93 (stating that discount found by Service's expert maybe "overgenerous" to taxpayer
but was required by the evidence). On remand from the Fifth Circuit, the court held that the assets the
decedent had transferred to the FLP were includible in his gross estate per § 2036. Strangi II, 85 T.CM.
(CCH) 1331,2003 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2003-145. Consequently the size of any discount with respect to his
LP interest became irrelevant.
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replaced with an LP interest worth $6,831 ,00o-a reduction of$3,069,000 in
the size ofD's gross estate!
II. ARE THE DISCOUNTS "FOR REAL"? Do THEY HAVE "ECONOMIC
SUBSTANCE"?
A. The "Fair Market Value" Standard
Under the regulations, "fair market value" is the applicable standard for
valuing property for gift and estate tax purposes.22 "Fair market value" is
defined as "the price at which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or to sell, and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. "23
The "willing buyer" and the "willing seller" referred to in the regulations
are hypothetical constructs and not actual persons.24 In particular, they are
neither the actual transferor nor the actual transferee, and no account may be
taken ofthe specific circumstances ofthe actual parties.2s This rule can have
a significant impact on valuation. For example, assume that of the one
hundred outstanding shares of XYZ, Inc., father (F) owns 40, unrelated
shareholders own 30 and F's son (S) owns the remaining 30. F dies and
bequeaths his 40 shares to S. These 40 shares, when added to the 30 shares
S already owns, give him full control ofXYZ, Inc. and thus have much greater
value to him than to an outsider. Nevertheless, under existing law, no account
may be taken of the shares the transferee already owns, and because the 40
shares are only a minority interest, their value will be discounted for lack of
22. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended in
1992).
23. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965). Treasury Regulation section 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992) contains virtually the same definition.
24. Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1251-53 (9th Cir. 1982); Estate of Bright v. United
States, 658 F.2d 999, 1005-06 (Former 5th Cir. 1981); see also Estate of Lee v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 860
(1978).
25. See, e.g., Estate of McClatchy v. Comm'r, 147 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding it was
irrelevant in valuing stock that that estate was a "nonaffiliate" and thus not subject to SEC rule restricting
sale of stock); Estate of Robinson v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 222 (1977) (holding it irrelevant that note received
in an installment sale would be subject to substantial income tax ifcoliected by the estate or a beneficiary;
proper test is what an unrelated party would pay for note). But cf Rothgery v. United States, 475 F.2d 591
(Ct. CI. 1973) (holding that in valuing father's 50"10 stock interest he left to son, fae t that such interest when
combined with son's 49.6% interest would enable son to liquidate corporation and realize shares'
liquidation value should be considered; however, court noted that even ifson's specific situation could not
be considered, any other buyer of father's interest would be able to fOICe liquidation and thus would pay
same amount).
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control.26 In effect, the transferred interest is valued by what an outsider
would pay for it. This rule has been justified on the ground that it provides an
"objective standard by which to measure value"27 and saves the courts from
being drawn into "boundless"28 inquiries as to the "feelings, attitudes, and
anticipated behavior" of the actual parties.29
The "willing buyer-willingseller" rule is applied differently to inter vivos
gifts than it is to testamentary transfers.30 The estate tax is assessed on the
basis of the entire interest that the decedent possesses in a given property at
26. See, e.g., Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1251-52 (valuing husband's bequest ofhis one-halfcommunity
property interest in real property to his wife as a noncontrolling 50% interest entitled to lack-of-control
discount even though bequest made wife sole owneroftheproperty); Bright, 658 F.2dat 1001-02, 1007-08
(valuing wife's bequest ofher one-halfcommunity property interest in a controlling bloc of stock to a trust
of which her husband was a trustee as a minority interest even though bequest gave husband control of
corporation); Estate ofLee v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 860,875-77 (1978) (valuing wife's bequest to her husband
ofher one-halfcommunity property interest in 80% bloc of stock as a 40% minority interest). In Estate of
Mellinger, the court refused to aggregate for valuation purposes stock passingunder the decedent'sprobate
estate with stock in the same company passing under a QTlP trust even though all the stock was included
in the decedent's gross estate. 112 T.C. 26, 38 (1999), acq. in result, 1999-2 CB. xvi.
The result should be the same ifF gave the 40 shares to S instead ofbequeathing them, although no
case has so held. See Fellows & Painter, supra note 8, at 896-97 (treating father's gift of two shares to son
as a minority interest qualifying for a lack-of-control discount even though transfer gave son a majority
stock interest in the company); Repetti, supra note 8, at 432-33 ("[M]inority discount should apply.").
Indeed, an inter vivos gift in this situation presents a stronger case for the allowance of a lack-of-control
discount than a bequest, since the gift tax focuses on each separate transfer while the estate tax focuses on
the total shares held by the decedent. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. In special cases, the
courts have sometimes disallowed a minority interest discount by aggrell'lting the transferred shares with
other shares. Feld,supra note 8, at 939-40; see, e.g., Estate ofMurphy v. Comm'r, 61 T.C.M. (CClI) 645,
659-64, 1990 T.C.M. (RIA) '\190,472, at 2243 (discussed infra Part III.E). Some courts have aggregated
the transferred shares with shares owned by other members of transferee's family. See, e.g., Blanchard v.
United States, 291 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Iowa 1968). However, the Service, reversing its fonner position, has
ruled that a minority discount will not be disallowed "solely because a transferred (Le., gifted) interest,
when aggregated with interest held by family members, would be part ofa controlling interest." Rev. Rut
93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202, 203; see also Priv. Ltr. Rut 94-32-00 I (Mar. 28, 1994).
27. Propstra, 680 F2d at 1252.
28. Id. at 1252 n.5.
29. Id. at 1252. Judge Posner criticized as "exaggerated" the concern about the boundless nature
of the inquiries the courts would be drawn into if they examined the actual facts surrounding the gift or
bequest, at least in some instances:
[The decision in Bright] seems driven by an overmastering desire for simplicity, achieved by
always valuing a transfer as ifthe parties were strangers rather than members of the same family or
otherwise entangled in a web ofrelationships that might change the actual value ofthe gift in either
direction .... This concern with simplicity is made explicit in Propstra v. United States, 680 F2d
1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982), yet seems exaggerated in [Bright] itself, where Mrs. Bright's will
created the trust that assured the continuation ofthe control bloc after her death.
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 839 F.2d 1249, 1253 (7th Cir. 1988).
30. William S. Blatt, Minority Discounts, Fair Market Value, and the Culture ofEstate Taxation,
52 TAX L. REV. 225, 234 (1997).
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the time of his death regardless of how that property is ultimately divided
among his heirs or legatees.31 In contrast, the gift tax is imposed on the value
of the separate interest passing to each donee.32 For example, assume D has
three children, A, B and C, and that he owns all 99 shares ofXYZ, Inc. IfD
gives 33 shares to each of his children, each gift will be valued as a minority
interest and will qualify for a lack-of-control discount. On the other hand, if
D retains the stock until his death and bequeaths 33 shares to each child, the
estate tax will be imposed on the value of all 99 shares with no discount for
lack of control.
The interaction of the rules discussed above makes it possible for a
taxpayer to convey control to a transferee and yet qualify for a lack-of-control
discount. Assume A owns all 100 shares ofXYZ, Inc. In Year 1, A gives 35
of these shares to D, her daughter. Since the shares constitute a minority
interest, they qualify for a lack-of-control discount. In Year 4, A gives Dan
additional 40 shares. These shares provide D with total control of the
corporation, but as explained above, no account may be taken ofthe shares D
already owns. The 40 shares are thus valued as a minority interest and are
entitled to a lack-of-control discount.33 Finally, in Year 7, A dies and
bequeaths her remaining shares to D. Since no account may be taken of the
shares D already owns, the bequest will be treated as a minority interest and
will qualify for another lack-of-control discount34 Obviously, this result cries
out for reform. Part IV will discuss various solutions to this problem.
3 I. Ahmanson Foundation v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1981); Estate ofCurry
v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424, 1426-30 (7th Cir. 1983).
32. See, e.g., Calderv. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 713 (1985); Rushtonv. Comm'r,60T.C. 272 (1973),afFd,
498 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1974); Averyv. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 963 (1944); Phipps v. Comm'r, 43 B.T.A. 1010
(1941), afFd, 127 F.2d214 (lOth Cir. 1942). These cases involved unsuccessful attempts by taxpayers to
treat gifts to multiple donees occurring on or about the same time as a single gift so that they would qualify
for a blockage discount. In part, the decisions are based on the language of Treasury Regulation section
25.2512-2(e) (as amended in 1976), which states that the availability of a blockage discount is to be
determined "with reference to each separate gift." This raises the possibility that determining value on the
basis of "each separate gift" is limited to blockage situations. However, the Service has never made that
assertion, and its rulings implicitly acknowledge that the gift tax is to be computed with reference to "each
separate gift." See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202 (holding that minority discount will not be
disallowed where parent gives away all the stock in a company by making simultaneous gifts of twenty
percent ofthestock to each ofhis five children "solely because atransferred interest, when aggregated with
interests held by family members, would be part of a controlling interest").
In Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 19S4)-not ablockage case-thecourt held
that a transfer of600 shares to a trust for the benefit ofthree beneficiaries equally should be treated as three
gifts of200 shares each, id. at 713-14, and allowed a 32.2% discount forlack ofcontrol. [d. at 721-22;see
also Estate of Bosca v. Camm'r, 76 T.CM. (CCH) 62, 1998 T.C.M. (RIA) 11 98,25 1.
33. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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B. Validity ofDiscounts Under Existing Rules
Ifa business interest must be valued by what a stranger would pay for it,
and if the interests that the transferee already owns must be disregarded, as
existing law requires, allowing discounts for lack ofmarketability and lack of
control is justified.
No one, including critics of the existing law, seriously denies that
interests in a closely-held business are more difficult to sell than publicly-
traded securities and that a buyer of such an interest will discount it, that is,
pay less for it to reflect its lack of liquidity.35 Indeed, Service experts
routinely allow discounts for lack of marketability.36 Allowance of the
discount is also supported by studies showing that stock for which
transferability was restricted by rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (i.e., so-called "letter stock") sold for substantially less than the
price at which unrestricted stock in the corporation sold for on the same day.37
Likewise, everyone acknowledges the propriety ofallowinga discount for
minority or noncontrolling interests given the existing valuation rules38 and
35. George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 161,196 (1977) ("Stock ofa closely-held corporation, which is not normally traded
and therefore not well known to prospective buyers, may accordingly suffer in sale value."); Fellows &
Painter, supra note 8, at 917 ("Courts properly have viewed the lack of a ready market for closely held
shares as a factor that diminishes a stock's value.").
36. See, e.g., Estate ofJones v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 121, 138 (2001)(Service expert anowed 7.5%
marketability discount); Strangi I, 115 T.C. 478,491-92 (2000), aff'd in pan. rev 'd andremanded in part.
al/ on unrelated issues, sub nom. Gulig v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002) (Service expert allowed
a 25% marketability discount on decedent's lP interest and a 15% marketability discount on his shares in
corporate genernl partner); Estate of Dailey v. Comm'r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 710, 712,2001 T.C.M. (RIA)
, 2001-263, at 1977 (Service expert allowed 14.1% marketability discount).
37. See generally PRATT ET AL., supra note 8, at 395-411. Although letter stock may not be sold
to the "public," it may under certain conditions be sold in private transactions, id. at 395-96, and it is these
private sales that provide the basis for computing the discounts. Id. The average discount on the sale of
letter stock, as found in nine studies, ranged from 23.0% to 33.8%. Id. at 404. Two other studies found
median discounts of 31.2% and 45.0%. [d.
Analysts generally believe that price discoun ts for lack of marketability for interests in closely held
companies are greater than those for restricted shares ofpublicly held companies, since the interests in the
closely held companies do not have an established market in which they can be sold following the removal
of certain trading restrictions. [d. at 403-04. Two studies attempted to test this proposition by comparing
the sale priceofstock in a c1osely-beld businessprior to the company's initial public offering, that is, when
there was no establishedmarketfor its stock, with the price the stock sold for in the offering. [d. at 404-11.
These studies showed discounts ranging from 40% to 63%. [d. at 411.
38. Cooper, supra note 35, at 197 ("The lack ofvoting control ... may be a substantial problem for
a stranger to a family corporation ...."); Feld, supra note 8, at 937 ("[I]t is fair to conclude that the price
obtainable by the outsider for the minority shares normally will be substantially less than the pro rata asset
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Service experts routinely allowsuch discounts.39 Allowance ofsuchdiscounts
is supported by data showing that a party acquiring control of a ~ublicly­
traded company (i.e., the target) will usually pay a premium, which is often
substantial, over the price thatnoncontrol shares ofthe target were trading for
prior to the announcement of the takeover offer.40
A discount for lack of control simply recognizes that a buyer of a
noncontrolling interest will pay less for that interest, on a per share or per unit
basis, than a buyer of a controlling interest. This is because a buyer of a
noncontrolling business interest has little or no say in the way the business'
assets and earnings (including his share of those assets and earnings) are
managed and disbursed. Those who have control, however, can "institute
ideas and programs in their self-interestbut, more importantly, they can ensure
that others cannot use the business and its assets in ways that are contrary to
the [controlling party's] needs and desires.'>41
Consider the position of an outsider who buys a minority interest in a
closely held family business. In many firms, family members hold all the
executive positions, for which they receive compensation, and any earnings
remaining after payment ofthat compensation are reinvested in the business.42
and income values."); FelIows & Painter,supra note 8, at 904 ("[C]ontrolling shares are valued more highly
than minority shares."); Repetti, supra note 8, at 425-27 (describing value of control).
39. See, e.g., Jones, 116 T.C. at 138-39 (Service expert allowed a 38% secondary market discount
that encompassedboth matketability and lack-of-controldiscounts.); Strangi I, 151 T.C. at 491-92 (Service
expert in his appraisal allowed an eightpercent lack-<>f-controldiscounton decedent's LP interest and a five
percent lack-<>f-eontrol discount on his shares in corporate general partner.).
40. A study by Mergerstat Review covering the period 1990 to 1999 showed that the average
premiwn offered ranged from a low of 35.1% in 1991 to a high of 44.7"10 in 1995. PRATT ET AL., supra
note 8, at 354-56. The study was limited to takeovers where the purchase price was at least one million
dollars, the shares tobe acquired represented at least ten percent ofthe company's equity, and where at least
one of the parties was a United States entity. Id. at 354. This data should be viewed cautiously since the
premiwn may reflect elements ofvalue in addition to a pure "control" premium. For example, part of the
premiwn may reflect synergies that the acquirer expects to result from the combination ofits business with
that of the target. /d. at 353-54.
A study undertaken by a trust officer of 30 actual sales of noncontrolling interests in closely-held
businesses showed that only 20% of them were made at a discount ofless than 20%, 53 1/3% were made
at discounts ranging from 22% to 48%, and 23 1/3% were made at discount ranging from 54.4% to 78%.
H. Calvin Coolidge, Fixing Value ofMinority Interest in Business: Actual Sales Suggest Discountas High
as 70%,2 EST. PLAN. 138, 141 (1975). The discounts were computed by reference to the companies'
adjusted book value. Id.
See generally PRATT ET AL., supra note 8, at 379-82, for other data showing the sale ofnoncontrolling
interests at discounts from net asset value in the case of holding companies (including closed-end mutual
funds) and limited partnerships.
41. Fellows & Painter, supra note 8, at 904.
42. There are various reasons why the controlling shareholders may prefer to pay the shareholder-
employees compensation rather than di stribute earnings to the shareholders generally. In some businesses,
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A stranger who buys a minority interest in such a business has no assurance
that he will receive an income-paying position in the firm43 or that the business
will start distributing its earnings. His only realistic hope for a cash return on
his investment (other than by selling it) is that at some indefinite time in the
future, the business will be sold or liquidated, or will start distributing
earnings. Given the uncertainty ofwhen, if ever, this will occur, an outsider
buying a minority interest will heavily discount the price he is willing to pay.
The above analysis does not necessarily mean that those who control the
business are "cheating" the outsider.44 The compensation they are paying
themselves maybe reasonable, and their decision to reinvest the earnings in
the business may simply reflect their preference for future growth rather than
an immediate return. (Of course, that preference may be influenced by the
fact that their current needs are taken care ofby the compensation they receive
from the business).45 On the other hand, there is always the danger of
the "controlling shareholders and company managers feel that the company belongs to those shareholders
who work for it. As a New York court observed, sharebolder-employees 'think that as they do the work and
have the responsibility, they are entitled to keep to themselves and divide among themselves al~ or the
substantial part, of the profits or gains of the business."' I F. HOOGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,
O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN SQUEEZE-OUTS
ANDOTHERINTRACORPORATE CONFLICTS § 2:09 (2ded. 2001)(quoting Godley v. Crandall & GodleyCo.,
139 N.Y.S. 236,244 (1st Dept. 1912), modified, 105 N.E. 818 (1914».
The controllingshareholders, being adequatelycompensated and having nocurrent need for additional
income, may also prefer to plow excess eamings back into the business, rather than distribute them in the
form ofdividends, to generate future growth.
Historically, theprincipal motivation for payingcompensationto shareholders rather than distributing
earnings was to avoid the "double taxation" ofcorporate earnings in a C cOlporatioo. Corporate earnings
are taxed when earned by the corporation and are taxed again when distributed to shareholders in the form
ofdividends. LR.C. § 61(a)(7). Ahhough compensation is taxed to the employee, id. § 61(a)(I), it, unlike
dividends, is deductible by the corporation. [d. § 162(a)(I). The "double taxation" mctor is much less
significant today because many closely-held businesses operate as "pass-thru" entities (e.g., Subchapter S
corporations, limited liability companies taxed as partnerships, limited partnerships, etc.) that pay no tax.
This may be less ofa factor even in a traditional C corporation since most dividends will now be taxed at
a maximum rate ofI5%, id. § I(h), while compensation is taxed at amaximum rate of35%, id. § I(a)-(d),
(I).
43. The current shareholders may view the corporation as belonging to their family. See I 0 'NEA L
& THOMPSON, supra note 42, § 2: 10. Consequently, they may be extremely reluctant to have the
corporation hire an outsider.
44. See William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale ofShares,
78 HARV. L. REV. 505, 526 (1965) (arguing that control is valuable even though holder thereof does not
abuse minority shareholders and even though the "minority stockholder receives. exactly the same return
per share as does the controlling stockholder").
45. This conflict between owners who participate in running a business and derive compensation
from it and those who are inactive in the business and must therefore rely upon the distribution ofearnings
also occurs where co-owners operate a business and one of them dies. The surviving co-owner and his
family continue to derive compensatioo from the business, while the heirs of the deceased c<>-owner who
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overreaching by the majority, and that danger provides a further reason why
the buyer of a minority interest will discount the price he is willing to pay.46
Many persons who accept this analysis when a business interest is placed
in an FLP fmd it difficult to believe that placing cash (or other liquid assets)
in an FLP has a similar effect. Yet a moment's reflection demonstrates this
is so. Consider the following question: Would you prefer $10,000 outright,
or would you prefer a 1% LP interest in a $1,000,000 fund where you have no
control over how the funds are invested or otherwise used, where your interest
will be difficult to sell and where you have no assurance that you will ever
receive any distributions, or if made, when that will occur? The question
answers itself.
Although the discounts are justified under theexisting "fairmarket value"
standard, the question remains whether that standard accurately values gifts.
That issue is explored below.
c. Why Do They Do It?
If the issuance of LP interests in an FLP results in a loss of "fair market
value"-as asserted above-why do taxpayers do it? Why would a taxpayer
undertake actions that result in the destruction of value? There are four
principal reasons:
(I) The taxpayer's dispositive plan makes a loss ofvalue unavoidable;
(2) The taxpayer may like the etrect of a loss in value;
(3) The loss in value is intended to be temporary;
(4) The "fair market value" standard understates actual value.
do not work in the business depend solely on distributions of earnings. As explained by the court in
Mountain State Steel Foundries v. Commissioner:
This sort of situation leads to demands for dividends out of consideration of the [inactive]
stockholders' personal financial need .... On the other hand, those stockholders active in the
management of the business deriving salaries from it may be able to afford indulgence of an
ambition to enlarge future earnings through still larger current capital expenditures, an indulgence
which the other stockholders may ill affotd. .
284 F.2d 737, 744-45 (4th Cir. 1960).
46. Legal remedies exist \\here the majorityshareholders, acting as directors,unreasonably withhold
dividends or siphon offbusiness earnings by awarding themselves unreasmable compensation. However,
such claims are very difficult to establish because of the wide discretion that courts allow directors under
the business judgment rule. Even ifsuccessful, prosecuting such claims is likely tobevery expensive. See
generally 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 42, §§ 3:04,3:05,3:07,3:08.
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(1) The Taxpayer's Dispositive Plan Makes a Loss ofValue Unavoidable
Suppose a parent, P, wishes to give away her unincorporated business to
her three children in equal shares. Carrying outher plan will inevitably result
in a loss in the aggregate fair market· value of the ownership interests.
Suppose the proprietorship in P's hands is worth $300. The interest received
by each child Will be a minority interestand accordingly will be entitled to a
lack-of~ontrol discount. Ifthe appropriate discount is 30%, the aggregate fair
market value ofthese interests will now be $210. This will be true regardless
of whether ownership interests in her business are transferred directly to the
children or are conveyed to them through an FLP. It is the dispositive terms
of the plan that produce the loss in fair market value-not the type of entity
used to effect that plan.47
(2) The Taxpayer May Like the Effect ofa Reduction in Value
Critics of current law contend that a taxpayer never willingly destroys
value. Therefore, the argument goes, the discounts presently allowed in
valuing LP interests must be illusory. However, in many cases the taxpayer
may actually like the consequences that result from a loss in value.
Consider P, who wishes to give C, her child, a financial interest in the
business but wants to retain control. P therefore transfers the business to an
FLP, takes back the GP interest for herself, and gives away, either currently
or over time, the LP interests to C. Based on the analysis above, the value of
the LP interests must be discounted to reflect their lack of control.
How does P feel about this purported lack of value in the LP interests?
It may not bother P at all; she may, in fact, see it as an advantage. The lack
of realizable value effectively "locks in" C in the FLP. This eliminates, or at
least greatly lessens,the danger that C will sell his interest to outsiders. More
significantly, the lack of realizable value will continue C's financial
dependence upon P. C will understand that he can realize the underlying
value represented by his LP interests only ifP ultimately gives him the GP
interest. C will therefore try to please P out of fear that ifhe displeases her,
P may end up not giving him the GP interest. Under these circumstances, it
47. It may be that the reduction in fair market value, as determined under current law, does not
accurately reflect the "true" value of the interests to the children. See infra Part ILC.4.
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is entirely plausible that P will undertake actions that reduce, at least in the
short run, the aggregate market value of her business.48
(3) The Loss Is Intended to Be Temporary
Suppose P operates a business worth $3,000,000. Ptransfers the business
to a newly formed FLP, takes back a 1% GP interest and 99% LP interests.
She gives the 99% LP interests to her son, S. Years later, P dies and in
accordance with her long-term plan, bequeaths the 1% GP interest to S. The
business is still worth $3,000,000. For purposes of this example, ignore the
discount for lack of marketability.
Under current law, P's gift of the LP interests to S will qualify for a
substantial discount because they lack control. Ifa 30% discount is allowed,
the 99% LP interests-whichrepresents $2,970,000 ofunderlying value in the
partnershijr-will be valued· at only $2,079,000 for gift tax purposes.49
However, this diminution in the value ofthe LP interests is merely temporary,
since it will cease upon P's death when S receives the 1% GP interest. P will
then have full control of the FLP and, assuming no change in the value ofthe
enterprise, will be able to sell the business for $3,000,000: $30,000 for the GP
interest and $2,970,000 for the LP interests.
By splitting the transfer of the business into two steps-inter vivos
transfers of the LP interests and a testamentary transfer of the GP
interest-$891,000 ofvalue will escape the transfer tax.so These tax savings
might well induce P to proceed in this fashion since the loss in value is only
temporary.5 I
48. Kenneth Kaye suggests that '1s]ome people bring their offipring into a business ... in order to
retard individuation;' that is, to keep them in a state of dependency. Kenneth Kaye, When the Family
Business Is a Sickness, 9 FAM. Bus. REV. 347, 359 (1996) (emphasis in original).
49. Equity represented by 99% LP interests: $2,970,000 [99% of $3,000,000]
30% discount for lack ofcontrol: 891,000 [30% of $2,970,000]
Fair market value of 99% 11' interests: $2,079,000
SO. Value of interests: $3,000,000
Amount taxed: 2.109.000 [$2,079,000 (99% LP) + $30,000 (1% GP)]
Value not taxed: $ 891,000
The above computation does not take account ofany annual exclusion that may have been allowable
on the inter vivos gifts of the 11' interests and may therefore understate the amount of value that passed
without tax.
5I. In particularly egregious cases, the Service has attempted to combat this phenomenon by
. invoking the "step transaction" doctrine. See infra Part m.E.
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(4) The "Fair Market Value" Standard May Understate Actual Value
The "fair market value" standard used to determine value for estate and
gift tax purposes focuses exclusively on the price that an outsider would pay
for the interest being valued. In doing so, it ignores other elements of value
that may inhere in the ownership of the business interest when held by an
"insider" and thus seriously understates its true value. This is particularly true
in a family business whose members work together as a harmonious unit.
In such a case, even family members who hold minority or noncontrolling
interests will often participate in the decision-making process and their views
will be given serious consideration.52 In many cases, the business will afford
noncontrolling family members employment, often at a higher rate of
compensation than they would receive elsewhere.53 Their needs are likely to
be considered in determining whether the business's earnings will be
distributed and, if so, to what extent.54 If the family members that own the
controlling interests decide to sell, they will most likely insist that the interests
ofthe noncontrolling family members be included in the sale so that they too
can participate in the control premium realized on the sale.55
In contrast, an outsider with a noncontrolling interest will almost always
.be frozen out ofthe decision making process. It is highly unlikely that he will
be offered a position in the business. His needs will almost certainly be
ignored in setting policy on the distribution ofearnings. In fact, frequently in
these cases no earnings will be distributed. Instead, the family will derive a
living from the compensation its members receive for running the business
and any earnings above the amount needed to pay compensation will be
reinvested in the business. The net result is that while family members are
able to derive a living from the business, an outsider is deprived ofany current
return on his investment.56
In light of an outsider's inability to derive any current benefit from his
interest, it is reasonable to base the value of his interest on the amount he
52. Feld, supra note 8, at 937 (positing the case ofa minority shareholder who participates in the
decision making process as a member of the control group).
53. Some families adopt a "family first" approach where anyone who wants to work in the business
is guaranteed an opportunity to do so, all family members receive equal compensation, and no family
member is ever fired. JOHN L. WARD, KEEPING THE FAMILY BUSINESS HEALTHY: How TO PLAN FOR
CONTINUING GROWTH, PROFITABIUTY AND FAMILY LEADERSHIP 142-43 (1987).
54. Feld, supra note 8, at 937.
55. [d.
56. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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could realize by selling it. In contrast, a noncontrolling family member will
often derive considerable current benefits from holding his interest. By
ignoring these benefits, the "fair market value" standard-which focuses
exclusively on what can be realized in a hypothetical sale ofhis interest-may
seriously understate the true value of the interest to a family member. If a
family member's views on the business are respected and given serious
consideration, ifthe business provides him with employmentat a satisfactory
level ofcompensation, and ifhe derives satisfaction from his status as a partial
owner of the business, he may be perfectly content to hold his interest in the
business indefinitely. In that case, the amount he could receive on a
hypothetical sale ofhis interest is oflimited or no interest to him-it is simply
beside the point.5?
III. THE SERVICE'S WEAPONS IN FIGHTING ABUSIVE FLPs: ARE THEY
STRONG ENOUGH?
The preceding Part showed that the fair market value standard, as
currently applied, often undervalues interests transferred to a donee or
legatee.58 Moreover, taxpayers, through careful sequencingoftheir gifts, may
transfer control ofan entity and yet obtain a lack-of-control discount for all or
a substantial part of the property transferred.59 This Part explores whether
existing legal doctrine is adequate to deal with these issues.
A. The Economic Substance, or Business Purpose, Tesfo
In Strangi, the Service asserted that the FLP lacked economic substance
and had no business (i.e., a non-tax) purpose and thus should be disregarded
for federal tax purposes.61 If this claim had succeeded, the decedent would
have been treated as holding his proportionate share of the FLP's assets
directly, and the assets themselves-rather than his FLP interest-would have
been included in his gross estate.62 To the extent those assets consisted of
57. See Cooper, supra note 35, at 197.
58. See supra Part n.C.4.
59. See supra Part I1.A.
60. The terms "economic substance" and "business pwpose" are generally used interchangeably.
See, e.g., Robert Thomton Smith, Business Purpose: The Assault Upon the Citadel, 53 TAX LAW. 1,1
(1999) ("The status of the business purpose, or economic substance, doctrine is solidly entrenched ....").
61. Strangi/, 115 T.C. 478, 484 (2000), afJ'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part sub nom. Gulig
v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002).
62. Assets owned directly by a decedent at the time ofhis death are includible in his gross estate
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cash and publicly traded securities,63 there would have been no discount for
either lack ofmarketability or lack ofcontro1.64
The estate asserted that Strangi had three business purposes for forming
the FLP,65 but the Tax Court expressed great skepticism as to whether any of
the purported purposes was genuine.66 Nevertheless, it held that the FLP
should be respected as a separate taxable entity:
[The FLP] was validly formed under State law. The formalities were followed, and the
proverbial "i's were dotted" and "t's were crossed". The partnership, as a legal matter,
changed the relationships between decedent and his heirs and decedent and actual and
potential creditors. Regardless of subjective intentions, the partnership had sufficient
substance to be recognized for tax purposes. Its existence would not be disregarded by
potential purchasers of decedent's assets, and we do not disregard it in this case.67
The Fifth Circuit sustained the Tax Court on this issue,68 and to date every
court confronting the issue has rejected the Service's attempt to disregard an
FLP.69 Recently, the Service abandoned this issue in two cases where it had
initially asserted the claim.70 Under the current state of the law, an FLP will
apparently be respected as a separate taxable entity so long as the parties
pursuant to § 2033 of the Code.
63. About 75% of the assets Strangi transferred to the FLP were cash or securities. Strangi I, 115
T.C. at 481. Although'the opinion does not expressly state that the securities were publicly traded, the lack
of any controversy over their value suggests they were.
64. Publicly traded securities do not qualitY for a marketability discount because they may readily
be converted into cash either on an exchange or the over-the-counter market. Publicly traded securities also
do not qualitY for a separate minority discount. They are valued on the basis of the prices at which small
minority interests of the security were sold for on the applicable valuation date. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2
(as amended in 1992); id. § 25.2512-2 (as amended in 1976). Allowing a minority interest discount from
these selling prices would thel'efore duplicate the discount.
65. StrangiI, 151 T.C.at485.
66. Id. at 485-86.
67. Id. at 486-87. In Strangi I, two judges concurred in the result but would have held that the
economic substance and business purpose doctrine was inapplicable whel'e the issue is the value of an
interest in the entity for estate and gift tax purposes. Id. at 493-94.
68. Gulig v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 279, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2002).
69. See also Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506 (2000); Estate ofThompson v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M.
(CCH) 374, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA) '2002-246; Estate ofDailey v. Comm'r, 82T.C.M. (CCH) 710, 712, 2001
T.C.M. (RIA)' 2001-263, at 1977. In a latel' proceeding in Dailey, the Service conceded that its position
that the FLP in that case should be disregarded fur tax purposes was not "substantiany justified" within the
meaning of § 7430(c)(4XB) of the Code. 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 633, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA) , 2002-301.
Accordingly, the court awarded attorney's fees to the estate for the time its counsel had propel'ly and
reasonably expended on that issue. Id.
70. Peracchio v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 412, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) , 2003-280; Lappo v.
Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 333,2003 T.C.M. (RIA) '2003-258.
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observe all formalities regarding its separate existence, and the FLP actually
carries on business or investment activities.71
B. Section 2703(a)(2)
Section 2703(a)(2) provides that the "value of any property shall be
determined without regard to ... any restriction on the right to sell or use such
property." The Service contends that the word "property," as used in that
section, encompasses assets that a taxpayer transfers to an FLP, and that the
partnership form is a "restriction" on the taxpayer's "right to sell or use" such
property that must be disregarded for valuation purposes. Consider a taxpayer
who transfers marketable securities to an FLP in exchange for an LP interest
and then claims that the interest should be discounted for lack ofcontrol. The
Service argues that the taxpayer's lack of control results from a "restriction"
imposedby the partnership form, namely, the provision ofpartnership law that
prohibits a limited partner from managing the partnership's business or assets.
Consequently, according to the Service, the reduction in value resulting from
that "restriction" must be disregarded in valuing the taxpayer's interest.
InStrangi, the court held that the word "property"as used in § 2703(a)(2)
refers only to the property that is to be valued for gift or estate tax purposes.
Thus, in the above example, "property" means the taxpayer's LP interest
rather than the assets transferred to the FLP,n and § 2703(a)(2)will not apply
unless there are restrictions on the taxpayer's right to sell or use his LP
interest Not one of the judges in Strangi adopted the Service's reading of
§ 2703(a)(2). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's ruling on this issue,73
71. These decisions seem correct. The results are consistent with the rule that applies to
corporations as stated by the Supreme Court in Moline Properties v. Commissioner: a corporation will be
respected as a separate taxable entity as long as it was formed for a purpose that "is the equivalent of
business activity or is followed by the carrying on ofbusiness by the corporation." 319 U.S. 436, 439
(1943) (emphasis added). Moline Properties has been interpreted to mean that a corporation will be
respected for tax purposes even ifformed to avoid taxes so long as it actually conducts business. See, e.g.,
Bass v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 595 (1968); Nat Harrison Assoc., Inc. v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 601 (1964), acq.
1965-2 C.B. 5. Since § 7701(a)(2) ofthe Code includes as a "partnership" any entity through which "any
business, financial operation, or venture is carried on," the reference to business activity in Moline
Properties should encompass "investing." In sum, an FLP should be recognized as a separate entity fortax
purposes so long as the partnership formalities are observed and it actually carries on a business or investing
activity.
72. Strangil, 115 T.C.478,487-89 (2000),aff'don this issue sub nom. Gulig v. Comm'r,293 F.3d
279 (5th Cir. 2002).
73. Gulig v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2002).
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and recently the Service abandoned its § 2703(a)(2) claims in two cases where
it had initially asserted them.74
C. Gift on Formation ofFLP
In Strangi, the decedent transferred assets worth $9.9 million to an FLP
in exchange for a 99% LP interesfS that had a value of about $6.8 million,
after allowance of a 31% discount for lack of marketability and lack of
control.76 The Service argued that if the court allowed the discount, it should
find that the decedent made a gift equal to the difference between these two
amounts.77 The Service based its argument on § 2512(b), which, in general,
defines a gift as the amount by which the value of the transferred property
exceeds the consideration received in retum.78
The court rejected this contention, stating "we do not believe that
decedent gave up control over the assets, his beneficial interest in them
exceeded 99[%], and his contribution was allocated to his own capital
account.,,79 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding on this issue.8o
The quoted language left it unclear whether the transferor's continued control
over the transferred assets was essential to the finding of no gift. However,
in the later case of Estate ofJones v. Commissioner, the Tax Court rejected
the Service's "gift on formation" argument even though it made no fmding on
whether the decedent continued his control of the transferred assets.81 It
merely stated that "[a]ll of the [decedent's] contributions of property were
properly reflected in [his] capital accounts . . , and the value of the other
partners' interests was not enhanced by the Contributions of decedent.'>82
74. See generally Peracchia, 86 T.CM. (CCH) 412, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) , 2003-280; Lappa, 86
T.C.M. (CCH) 333, 2003 T.CM. (RIA) , 2003-258.
75. Strangi I, 115 T.e. at 481.
76. The Tax Cwrt allowed an overall discount of 31% with respect to the LP interests. Id. at
491-93. Applying this discount, the fair market value of the 99% LP interest received by Mr. Strangi upon
formation of the FLP was $6.8 million:
Value ofpr~erty transferred: $9.9 million
Less 31% discount: 3.1 million
Value of99% LP interest received: $6.8 million
The Tax Cwrt did not make lhe above computation, since it was valuing the LP interests at the time
of Mr. Strangi's death rather than at the time he received the LP interests.
77. Id. at 489.
78. I.R.C. § 2512.
79. Strangi I, 115 T.e. at 490.
80. Gulig v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2002).
81. Estate of Jones v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 121,128 (2001).
82. Id.
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The following example illustrates the court's point that a taxpayer's
contribution of property to an FLP will not enhance the value of the other
partners' interests so long as the taxpayer's account is properly credited with
the full fair market value of the contributed property. Assume that A
contributes property worth $900,000 to a newly formed FLP in exchange for
a 90% LP interest, while B contributes $100,000 to the FLP in exchange for
a 10% GP interest. To reflect their respective contributions, A's capital
account is credited with $900,000 and B's is credited with $100,000.
Assuming a combined discount of 30% for lack of control and lack of
marketability, the fair market value ofA's LP interest is only $630,000 even
though he contributed property worth $900,000. A has suffered a $270,000
loss in value, but this loss in no way enhances or changes B's interest. Since
their respective capital accounts have been credited in the ratio of 9: 1, all
earnings and distributions will be allocated to A and B in a ratio of 9: I-no
matter what value is ascribed to A's LP interest. Thus, ifthe FLP is liquidated
immediately after its formation, A and B will receive back their respective
$900,000 and $100,000 contributions, and likewise any earnings of the FLP
will be allocated to A and B in the ratio of9: I. There is no gift because there
is no transfer of value from A to B.83 This hypothetical is essentially what
83. There is no gift to the FLP. Both the regulations and the case law recognize that a grntuitous
transfer of property to an entity is not a gift to the entity but rnther to the owners or beneficiaries of the
entity (other than the transferor) to the extent of their interests therein. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(I) (as
amended in 1997) (stating that a grntuitous transfer to a corporation is "generally" a gift to the shareholders
(other than the transferor) to the extent of their interests therein rather than a gift to the cOlporation but
stating there may be an exception for a transfer "to a charitable, public, political or similar organization");
Helveringv. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393 (1941) (holding that for the purposeofthe annual exc!usion a transfer
to a trust is not a gift to the trust or the trustee but to the beneficiaries to the extent oftheir interests in the
trust); Shepherd v. Comm'r, 283 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002) (treating father's transfer ofland to FlP as
gift to sons who were partners in FLP); Kincaid v. United States, 682 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982) (treating
transfer to corporation as gifts to other shareholders based on their respective stock interests); Chanin v.
United States, 393 F.2d 972 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (treating a transfer to a subsidiary of a family holding
corporntion as gifts to individual shareholders of the holding company (other than the transferor) based
upon their respective stock interests in the holding company).
Some earlier cases had treated a transfer to a corporation as a gift to the entity. See, e.g., Thompson
v. Comm'r, 42 B.T.A. 121 (1940). In Heringer v. Commissioner, the court, acknowledging the earlier line
of cases, sidestepped the issue ofwhether a contribution to a corporntion was a gift to the corporation or
to the shareholders, since it found that even ifa gift to the shareholders, it would not qualify for the annual
exclusion since it was a future interest. 235 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1956). However, Treasury Regulation
section 25.2511-1(h)(I) and the other authorities cited above make it clear that the law today treats a
gratuitous transfer to an entity as a gift to those owning or having beneficial interests in the entity (other
than the transferor) based on their respective interests in the entity. See generally 5 BORIS I. BITTKER &
LAWRENCELoKKEN,FEDERAL TAXATIONOFINCOME,EsTATESANDGIFTS' 124.2 (2ded. 1993); RICHARD
B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION' 10.01 [2][a]-[b] (6th ed. 1991).
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occurred in Strangi and Jones.
No court has accepted the Service's "gift on fonnation" argument, and the
Service abandoned this argument in a recent case before the Tax Court.84
D. Section 2704(b)
Frequently the FLP agreement will prohibit a limited partner from
withdrawing and liquidating his interest in the partnership prior to the FLP's
dissolution, and another provision will set the date for dissolution sometime
in the distant future (e.g., 50 years after the partnership's fonnation). The
obvious purpose ofthese provisions is to depress the value ofthe LP interests
by restricting a limited partner's ability to realize the liquidation value ofhis
interest (i.e., the amount he could obtain ifthe FLP were liquidated).
The Service has argued that § 2704(b) requires such provisions to be
disregarded in valuing the partnership interests. That section states that ifa
donor or decedent (i.e., the "transferor") transfers an interest in a partnership
or corporation to a member ofhis family, and if the transferor and his family
controlled the entity immediately before the transfer, then "any applicable
restriction" shall be disregarded in valuing the transferred interest85
"Applicable restriction" is defined as any restriction that "effectively
limits the ability of the corporation or partnership to liquidate,"86 and which
the transferor or any member of his family has a right, either individually or
collectively, to remove following the transfer.87 However, the statute excepts
from this definition "any restriction imposed, or required to be imposed, by
any Federal or State law.,,88 The regulations add the following gloss to the
statutory definition of "applicable restriction": "An applicable restriction is
a limitation on the ability to liquidate the entity (in whole or in part) that is
more restrictive than the limitations that would apply under the State law
generally applicable to the entity in the absence of the restriction. '>89
InKerr v. Commissioner, the partnership agreement provided, inpertinent
part, that the partnership would dissolve and liquidate upon the earlier of
December 31, 2043, (i.e., 50 years after fonnation of the FLP) or the
84. Lappov. Connn'r, 86T.C.M. (CCH) 333, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA)'2003-258.
85. I.R.C. § 2704(b)(1).
86. /d. § 2704(b)(2)(A).
87. /d. § 2704(b)(2)(B)(ii). An applicable restriction also includes a restriction that effectivelylimits
the ability of a corporation or a partnership to liquidate and that lapses, in whole or in part, after the
transfer. Id. § 2704(b)(2)(B)(i).
88. Id. § 2704(b)(3)(B).
89. Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b) (1992).
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agreement of all the partners.90 Applicable state law provided that a limited
partnership would dissolve upon the earliest of the following: (1) the
occurrence of events specified in the partnership agreement as causing
dissolution; (2) the written consent of all partners to dissolution;
(3) withdrawal of the general partner; or (4) entry of a decree of judicial
dissolution.91
The court held that the partnership's provision on dissolution was not an
applicable restriction because it was no more restrictive than state law (i.e., it
did not make it more difficult to liquidate the FLP).92 The court did not
explain its reasoning, but it may have found that state law, by stating that
dissolution was to occur upon the events specified in the partnership
agreement, in effect adopted whatever provision the partners chose regarding
events of dissolution.93 Consequently, any such provision would necessarily
be no more restrictive than state law. Note also that under the state law in
Kerr a partner might never receive the liquidation value ofher interest, while
under the partnership provision she was assured of receiving it no later than
December 31, 2043.94
The partnership agreement also provided that no limited partner could
withdraw from the partnership prior to the partnership's dissolution and
liquidation.95 The Tax Court found that this was not an applicable restriction,
even though applicable state law generally permitted a limited partner to
withdraw upon six months written notice, since it was not a "limitation on the
ability to liquidate the entity. "96 The court noted that "a limited partner may
90. Kerrv. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 449,472 (I 999), aff'd, 292 F.3d490 (5th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Kerr
1].
91. [d.
92. [d. at 473.
93. The partnership agreement may have omitted some of the events that would cause dissolution
under state law (e.g., withdrawal ofa general partner). Compare the state law provision, id. at 472, with
the provisions in the partnership agreement. [d. at 455. This omission, ifit occurred, would not make the
partnership provisions more restrictive than the state law since the omitted state law provisions were
binding on all partnerships in the state even if not set forth in the agreement. In other words, they were
mandatory provisions rather than default provisions.
94. The Service adopted this reasoning in holding that a provision requiring the termination of a
business trust on a certain date was not an applicable restriction where state law provided that business
trusts were to have perpetual existence. Priv. Ltr. Rut. 97-1()'()21 (Dec. 6,1966).
95. Kerr [, 113 T.C. at 455.
96. [d. at 473 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b) (1992) (emphasis added». To be more precise,
the Tax Court said the state law provision setting forth the withdrawal rights of a limited partner was not
a "limitation on the ability to liquidate the entity." [d. However, both the Fifth Circuit in its decision
affirming the Tax Court, 292 F.3d 490,494 n.5, and the Tax Court in Knight v. Commissioner, 115 T.e.
506, 519-20 (2000), construed the Tax Court's decision in Kerr as holding that the provision in the
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withdraw from a partnership without requiring the dissolution and liquidation
of the partnership,'097 and thus a limitation on the right of a limited partner to
withdraw is not a limitation on the ability to liquidate the partnership.98
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision but on a
different theory.99 The taxpayers in Kerr had donated small amounts ofLP
interests to the University of Texas. 100 Therefore, the University's written
consent was required for the removal of the provisions discussed above. 101
The Fifth Circuit concluded that such provisions were not applicable
restrictions, because the taxpayers and their family members lacked the power
by themselves to effect their removal as required by § 2704(b)(2)(B)(ii).102
The court rejected the Service's argument that the restrictions should be
deemed removable because the evidence indicated that the University would
not oppose their removal ifproposed by the Kerr family: "The Code provides
no exception allowing us to disregard nonfamily partners who have stipulated
their probable consent to the removal of a restriction.,,103
Several states have amended their limited partnership laws to prohibit a
limited partner from withdrawing from his partnership prior to its dissolution
unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise. ,04 In those states, the
issue ofwhether a restriction on a partner's power to withdraw is a "limitation
on the ability to liquidate the partnership" is academic. Even ifso considered,
the restriction would not be an "applicable restriction" since it is no more
restrictive than the state law rule generally applicable to limited partnerships.
It has been reported that the Service has asserted that a restriction on a
partner's ability to withdraw is a restriction on his "right to sell or use" his
partnership interest within the meaning of § 2703(a)(2) and hence must be
partnership agreement was not a "limitation on the ability to liquidate the entity."
97. Kerr I, 113 T.e. at 473.
98. The Tax Court followed its holding in Kerr I in Knight. 115 T.e. 506,519-20 (2000). The
court's reasoning in Kerr I might be questioned. It is true that a partner's withdrawal from a firm does not
result in the liquidation of the firm as a whole. However, the definition of"applicable restriction" round
in the regulations specifically refers to a liquidation of the entity "in whole or in part." Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2704-2(b) (I 992)(emphasis added). The firm's payment to the withdrawing partner to buyout his
interest-and the resultant diminution in the firm's assets-would seem to constitute a liquidation of the
firm "in part." Id.
99. Kerr v. Corom'r, 292 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Kerr II].
100. Id. at 491.
101. Id. at494n.7.
102. Id. at 494.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., DEl. CODE ANN., tit. 6, § 17-603 (2003); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 121-603
(McKinney Supp. 2003). New York made a corresponding change with respect to limited liability
companies. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 606 (McKinney 2003).
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disregarded in valuing the partner's interest. los No case has yet ruled on this
theory.
E. Step Transaction Doctrine
In Estate ofMurphy v. Commissioner, the decedent held a general power
of appointment over (and thus was considered for transfer tax purposes as
owning)'06 51.41% ofa company's stock. 107 Eighteen days before her death,
she gave a 0.88% stock interest to each of her two children reducing her
interest to 49.65%. I 08 The purpose ofthe gift was to enable her estate to claim
a minority interest discount 109 In her will, she bequeathed her remaining
49.65% interest to trusts established for her two children. I 10
The court refused to allow a minority discount. I II It treated the gifts of
the two 0.88% interests and her bequest of her 49.65% stock interest as
integral steps in a single plan to transfer control of the company. 112 By
collapsing the twotransactions into a single testamentarydisposition, the court
was able to treat them as a transfer of a majority interest (i.e., 51.41%) and
thus not entitled to a minority discount. I 13
The difficulty with applying the step transaction doctrine and treating a
deathbed gift as part ofa testamentary transfer is that it seems to conflict with
Congress's intent in amending § 2035 in 1981 to exclude gifts made within
three years ofthe decedent's death-includingdeathbed gifts-from his gross
105. Porter, supra note 15, § 24.04[2][b] (2003). Mr. Porter argues that Congress never intended the
word "use" as used in § 2703(a)(2) to encompass a partner's liquidation rights but instead intended the
section to focus narrowly on abusive options and buy-sell agreements. [d.
106. See I.RC. §§ 2041, 2514.
107. Estate ofMurphy v. Comm'r, 60T.C.M. (CCH) 645,645, 1990T.C.M.(P-H)'90,472,at2243.




112. [d. at 662, 1990 T.C.M.(P-H), 90,472 at 2262.
113. Judge Colvin did not eKpressly state diat the pre-death gifts and the bequest were part ofa single .
testamentary transfer. However, that seems to be the necessary conclusion of his holding. He did not
recognize the pre-death transfer of the two 0.88% interests as a relinquishment ofcontrol because it "lacked
substance and economic effect." Estate ofMurphyv. Comm'r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645,662, 1990 T.C.M.
(P-H), 90,472, at 2262. If the purported gift lacked substance during the decedent's life, it fullows that
it became effective only after death and thus should be considered part of the testamentary transfer. The
Service has construed Murphy as treating the lifetime gift and the bequest as parts ofa single testamentary
transfer. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-42-003 (July 2, 1998) ("As was the case in [Murphy], the entire
transaction ... must be viewed as a single testamentary transaction occurring at Decedent's death. ").
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estate. 114 Treating a transfer of property as a testamentary disposition is
inconsistent with excluding the property from the transferor's gross estate.
The explanation for the holding may lie in the extreme facts ofthe case. I IS
The court emphasized: (1) the transfer occurred only eighteen days before
death; (2) the transfer was made solely to qualify the shares passing at death
for a minority interest discount; 116 and (3) nothing really changed during the
eighteen-dayperiod. 117 The court pointed out that during that period, decedent
continued as chairman of the board and her two children continued to occupy
top executive positions with the company. It concluded "that all concerned
intended nothing of substance to change and [during that period] nothing of
substance did change."118 Given these facts, it was easy to conclude that the
two transfers were integral parts of a single testamentary disposition.
The Service has citedMurphy in many private letter rulings and technical
advice memoranda as authority for disallowing discounts. I 19 By combining
lifetime transfers with transfers at death, the Service is able to transform
separate transfers of minority interests into a single transfer of a controlling
interest and thereby render the transfer ineligible for a minority discount.
Surprisingly, the Service does not seem to have aggressively usedMurphy
in litigation. For example, it apparently did not attempt to apply the step
transaction doctrine in Strang; even though the case shares many factors with
Murphy: (1) only two months elapsed between the creation of the FLP and
decedent's death; 120 (2) decedent's LP interests passed under his will to the
114. Economic Recovery Act ofI981,Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 424, 95 Stat. 173,317 (1981) (codified
at I.RC. § 2035(d». It appears that Congress clearly understood that even deathbed gifts would be
excluded from the donor's gross estate under the revised version of § 2035. Thus the Senate raised
objections to the House version-which was the version ultimately adopted---because of concern that it
''would allow decedents to arrange their estates on their death bed in order to qualify for" favorable estate
tax treatment. S.REp. No. 97-144, at 138 (1981)(emphasis added); see a/so H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-215,
at 255 (stating that the Conference agreed to follow the House's bill with respect to the amendment of
§ 2035). Judge Colvin, however, rejected the argument that the 1981 changes to § 2035 prevented the court
from treating Mrs. Murphy's deathbed gift and her testamentary transfer as a single integrated transfer.
Murphy, 60 T.CM. (CCH) at 665, 1990 T.C.M. (P-H), 90,472 at 2264-65.
115. /d. at 658, 1990 T.C.M. (P-H), 90,472 at 2257 ("[T]he facts in this case are extreme.").
116. ld. ("A minority discount should not be applied ifthe explicit purpose and effect offragmenting
the control block of stock was solely to reduce Federal tax.").
117. ld. at 659, 1990 T.C.M. (P-H), 90,472 at 2258.
118. ld.
119. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-30-004 (Apr. 3, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-42-003 (July 2,
1998); Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-19-006 (Jan. 14, 1997).
120. TheFLPwas fonnedon August 12, 1994,Strangil, 115 T.C. 478, 480-81 (2000), afTdinpart,
rev'd and remanded in part sub nom. Gulig v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002), and the decedent
died on October 14, 1994. ld. at 482.
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same four children who held a controlling interest in the corporate general
partner of the FLP (thus strengthening the argument that the two transfers
should be integrated); 121 and (3) nothing ofsubstance changed during the two-
month period)22
The Service's reticence in invoking Murphy in litigation may stem from
its realization that Congress generally intended lifetime gifts to be excluded
from the gross estate and thus is reservingMurphy for only the most egregious
cases. 123 But there is another possibility. Given its recent success in using
§ 2036, it may no longer feel the need to rely on amorphous judicial doctrines
such as the step transaction doctrine when a statutory alternative is available.
Indeed, Judge Colvin in Murphy hinted at the possible application of
§ 2036(a)(1) but did not reach that issue since neither party had raised it!24
F. Section 2036
The Service has enjoyed great success in applying § 2036125 to FLPs,
having won every case but one in which it made that claim. 126 In each case
that the Service won, the court found that the decedent had retained, for life,
enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the assets she had transferred
to the FLP. This fmding triggered § 2036(a)(1), causing the transferred assets
to be included in her gross estate at their date-of-death values. However, in
the recently decided Strangi case, the court also found that the decedent had
retained for his life the right to determine who should enjoy or receive the
income from the transferred property thereby making § 2036(a)(2)
121. The decedent's will named his children as the sole residual beneficiaries ofhis estate. [d. at 480.
They also owned 53% of the stock ofFLP's general partner. [d. at 481.
122. Strangi ll, 85 T.CM. (CCH) 1331, 1339,2003 T.C.M. (RIA) '112003-145, at 740.
123. One commmtatorhas noted that although Murphy is "often cited by the Service, ... [it is] not
often cited by the courts because ofits focus on taxpayer motive, rather than on well-settled estate planning
principles." Gagliardi, supra note 5, at 376.
124. EstateofMurphyv. Corom'r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645, 665,1990 T.C.M. (P-H) 'II 90,472, at2265.
125. I.R.C. § 2036.
126. The Service unsuccessfully tried to apply § 2036 in Church v. United States, 2000-1 U.S.T.C.
(CCH) '1160,369, at 84,781 (W.O. Tex. 2000), but succeeded in the following cases: Kimbell v. United
States, 244 F. Supp. 2d 700 (ND. Tex. 2003); Estate ofReichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 144 (2000);
Strangi ll, 85 T.CM. (CCH) 1331,2003 T.C.M. (RIA) '112003-145; Estate ofThompson v. Commissioner,
84 T.C.M. (CCH) 374, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA) '112002-246; Estate ofHarper v. Commissioner, 83 T.CM.
(CCH) 1641,2002 T.C.M. (RIA) '112002-121; Estate ofSchauerhamerv. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH)
2855,1997 T.C.M. (RIA) '1197,242.
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applicable. '27 That holding is highly controversial and, according to some,
may threaten the continued viability of FLPs as a taxi>lanning device. 128
0) Section2036(a)(~
The courts have held that the following factors are indicia that the
decedent continued to "enjoy" the assets she had transferred to the FLP within
the meaning of § 4036(a)(I):
(1) The decedent transferred substantially all her assets to the FLP.129 This suggests
there was an understanding that decedent was to have continued access to the
FLP's funds, since otherwise she would run the risk ofhaving insufficient assets
to live on.130
(2) The transfer of title from decedent to the FLP with respect to assets she had
transferred to it was either improperly recorded or done so tardily. 131
(3) The decedent transferred her residence to the FLP but continued to live in it rent
free. l32 Even charging the decedent a fair market rental will not take the "curse"
off this factor if the rent is not promptly paid in an arm's length, business-like
manner.133
(4) . The decedent commingled her personal assets and those of the FLP. 134
(5) The FLP distributions were disproportionately in favor of the decedent or her
estate. qs
. (6) The FLP' s income and property were used to satisfy the contemporaneous needs
of the decedent or her estate. 136
127. Strangi II, 85 T.CM. (CCH) at 1340-44,2003 T.CM. (RIA) '112003-145, at 741-45.
128. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
129. Reichardt, 114 T.C. at 153 n.7 (finding estimate that decedent transferred 98% ofassets to FLP
"reasonable"); Strangi II, 85 T.CM. (CCH) at 1338,2003 T.C.M. (RIA) '112003-145, at 739 (finding that
decedent transferred about 98% of wealth to FlP); Thompson, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) at 386, 2002 T.C.M.
(RIA) 'II 2002-246, at 1524 (finding that decedent "parted with almost all of his wealth" when FLPs
formed); Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1643,2002 T.C.M. (RIA)'II2002-121,at 710 (finding that decedent
conveyed to FLP approximately 94% ofhis wealth).
130. Reichardt, 114 T.C. at 153; Strangi II, 85 T.CM. (CCH) at 1330, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA)
'112003-145, at 739; Thompson, 84 T.CM. (CCH) at 386, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA) '112002-246, at 1524.
131. Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1648-49,2002 T.CM. (RIA) '112002-121, at 717-19.
132. Reichardt, 114 T.e. at 152.
133. Strangi II, 85 T.CM. (CCH) at 1330,2003 T.C.M. (RIA) '112003-145, at 739.
134. Estate of Schauerhamec v. Comm'T, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855, 2857-88, 1997 T.C.M. (RIA)
'1197,242, at 1505; Reichardt, 114 T.C. at 152; Harper, 83 T.CM. (CCH)at 1648-49,2002 T.CM. (RIA)
'112002-121, at 717-18.
135. Harper, 83 T.CM. (CCH)at 1650, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA) '112002-121, at 719.
136. Reichardt, 114 T.C. at 152 (finding that decedent used partnership's checking account as his
personal account); Strangi II, 85 T.CM. (CCH) at 1339, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) '112003·145, at 739-40
(finding that FLP funds were used to pay for decedent's nursing care); Thompson, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) at
386-87,2002 T.C M. (RIA) '112002-246, at 1524 (finding that funds were provided to decedent so he could
continue his practice of making annual gifts and to cover his anticipated expenses); Harper, 83 T.C.M.
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(7) The transferred property was managed the same way as it was before the
transfer. 137
One cannot read these cases without sensing the courts' hostility toward
the discounts made possible by the use ofFLPs and concluding that the courts
will seize upon any taxpayer misstep, no matter how small, to apply
§ 2036(a)(l). Indeed, some arguments the courts have used seem unjustified.
For example, the courts have sometimes treated funds that the FLP advanced
to the decedent's estate so it could pay estate expenses as, in effect, payments
to the decedent. 138 This is unjustified. The issue under § 2036(a)(I) is
whether there was an implicit understanding that the decedent wouldcontinue
to enjoy the transferred property during her life. The use of the FLP's funds
after the decedent's death is irrelevant to this issue. Moreover, in most of
these cases, the other partners ofthe FLP were a/so the residuary beneficiaries
of the decedent's estate and as such were responsible for payment of these
expenses. Thus, it is more realistic to say that using FLP funds to pay that
liability effectively benefited the other partners-not the decedent.139
In practice, § 2036(a)(1) is simply a trap for the unwary. By scrupulously
observing the formalities and avoiding the pitfalls mentioned above, that
section may be easily avoided Nothing in these cases creates an
(CCH) at 1650,2002 T.C.M. (RIA) '112002-121, at 719 ("Similarly significant is the evidence that certain
ofthe distributions to the Trust were linked to a contemporaneous expenseofdecedentpersonallyor ofhis
estate.").
137. Strangi II, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1339, 2003 T.e.M. (RIA) '112003-145, at 740 ("(V]irtually
nothing beyond formal title changed in decedent's relationship to his assets."); Thompson, 84 T.CM.
(CCH) at 386-87,2002 T.C.M. (RIA) '112002-246, at 1524; Schauerhamer, 73 T.C.M. (CCH)at 2858, 1997
T.C.M. (RIA) '1197,242, at 1505; Reichardt, 114 T.e. at 152 (''Nothing changed except legal title.").
138. See, e.g., Harper, 83 T.CM. (CCH) at 1641-50,2002 T.CM. (RIA) '112002-121, at 708-19.
In Harper, the distributions were still disproportionately in favor of the decedent even if the distribution
of funds to pay estate expenses is disregarded. [d. at 1650, 2002 T.e.M. (RIA) '112002-121, at 719.
Decedent at the time of his death held a 39% interest in the FLP through his revocable trust while his
children had a 61% interest. [d. at 1641-44,2002 T.C.M. (RIA) 'II 2002-121, at 708-09, 711-12. Before
his death, the FLPdistributed $21 ,820 to the decedent's revocable trust out oftetal distributions of$36,320,
or60%. /d. at 1644-46,2002 T.CM. (RIA)'II2002-121, at 712-13. Butthecourtinjustifying its statement
that the distributions were "heavily weighted in favor of decedent," id. at 1650, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA)
'112002-121, at 719, states that through the end of October 1995, the FLP made distributions of$231,820
to the decedent's revocable trust as compared with distributions of only $14,500 to his children. [d.
However, $210,000 ofthe payments to the trust was for the payment of estate expenses. [d. at 1644-46,
2002 T.CM. (RIA) '112002-121, at 712-13. .
139. In Harper, the decedent's children were the other partners ofthe FLP. 83 T.C.M (CCH) 1641.
1642,2002 T.C.M. (RIA) '112002-121, at 711-12. As remaindermen ofdecedent's revocable trust, id., 2002
T.C.M. (RIA) '112002-121, at 708, they were also the persons who would effectively bear the economic
burden of the estate tax on the trust assets. See I.R.C. § 2207B. Thus. the use ofthe FLP's funds to help
pay the estate tax benefited them.
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insurmountable obstacle to the continued use of FLPs to save estate and gift
tax.
(2) Section2036(a)(2)
The Tax Court's holding in Strangi that § 2036(a)(I) applied was not
surprising in light of its precedents, but its holding that § 2036(a)(2) applied·
was an unexpected "bombshell."'40 .
The court found that Strangi possessed a "legally enforceable power" to
determine, in conjunction with the other partners, whether the FLP would
distribute its earnings (and ifso, the amount of the distribution) and whether
the FLP would be liquidated. '41 These powers, according to the court, enabled
Strangi to determine who should possess or enjoy the property he transferred
to the FLP and the income therefrom They thus constituted § 2036(a)(2)
powers, and the assets Strangi transferred to the FLP were includible in his
gross estate at their date-of-death values.142
. The estate had relied on Byrum v. United States, 143 in which the decedent
retained the right to vote stock that he had transferred to a trust. I 44 In Byrum,
the government had argued that the decedentpossessed a § 2036(a)(2) power
since he could control the payment ofdividends through his voting control of
the corporation and in that way could "regulate" the amount ofincome, ifany,
paid to the trust beneficiaries.145 The Supreme Court rejected this argument
pointing out, among other factors, that Byrum's voting power was constrained
by his fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders.146 The tax bar
felt confident that § 2036(a)(2) posed no threat to FLPs, because any power
the decedent possessedas partner to makedistribution or liquidation decisions
was constrained byhis fiduciary duty to the partnership and his other partners.
The tax bar's confidence was bolstered by private letter rulings issued by the
Service endorsing this analysis. 147
140. Gans& B1attmachr,supra note 5,at 1154-55 (stating that court's § 2036(a)(I)holdingwas "not
unexpected" but its § 2036(a)(2) holding "took many in the estate-planning community by surprise").
141. Strangi II, 85 T.CM. (CCH) at 1341-42,2003 T.CM. (RIA) ~2003-145, at 742-44.
142. Id. at 1342,2003 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2003-145, at 746-47.
143. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
144. Id. at 126-27.
145. Id. at 131-32.
146. Id. at 137, 14243.
147. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-15-007 (Apr. IS, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-10-039 (Mar. 12,1993);
Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-31-006 (Aug. 2,1991). It appears that only the decedent and members ofhis family
were partners in the FLPs described in these rulings.
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However, the court in Strangi held that Byrum was inapplicable because
of crucial distinctions between the two cases. 148 In Byrum, the ultimate
decision on whether income would be paid to the trust beneficiaries was
vested in an independent trustee that had complete discretion to accumulate
or distribute income.149 Even if Byrum flooded the trust with dividends, he
could not control whether those dividends would be distributed by the trust. 150
In contrast, there was no independent intermediary trustee in Strangi. 151 The
corporations involved in Byrum were operating businesses and thus their
ability to distribute dividends was constrained by business and economic
factors (e.g., the need to expe~d funds to meet competition; to make, and
respond to, changes in product lines; to replace plant and equipment; and for
growth and expansion). 152 In contrast, these constraints did "not apply to [the
FLP or the corporate general partner in Strangi] , which held only monetary or
investmentassets."153 In Byrum; enforcement ofthe decedent's fiduciary duty
was a realistic possibility because there were a "significant number of
unrelated parties," while inStrangi,. all parties were members of the
decedent's immediate family. 154
The court dismissed the private letter rulings holding to the contrary by
simply noting that such rulings, by statute, had no precedential effect.155
Critics have attacked the Strangi decision on several grounds:
(I) The court misread and misapplied the Supreme Court's holding in Byrum; 156
148. Strangi II, 85 T.CM. (CCH) 1331, 1340-43,2003 T.C.M. (RIA) 11 2003-145, at 744-45.
149. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 126-27,143 (1972).
ISO. Id. at 143.
lSI. Strangi II, 85 T.CM. (CCH)at 1342,2003 T.C.M. (RIA) 11 2003-145, at 744.
152. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 139-41.
153. Strangi II, 85 T.CM. (CCH)at 1342,2003 T.C.M. (RIA) '2003-145, at 744.
154. Id. at 1342-43,2003 T.CM. (RIA) 11 2003-145, at 744-45.
ISS. Id. at 1343,2003 T.C.M. (RIA)'2003-145, at 745. The relevant Code section is §6110(k)(3).
156. Gans& Blattmachr,supra note 5, at 1156-59. The authors ofthe article assert that the Supreme
Court "did not intend to adopt a facts-and-circumstances approach but rather to create a bright-line test
turning on whether the grantor retained a legally enforceable right." Id. at 1157. In their view, the Court's
reference to the substantial number ofunrelated shareholders in Byrum was not intended to justify its ruling
but rather was an "explication of the rationale for its bright-line test." Id. This is a plausible, but hardly
a necessary, reading of Byrum. The Court did state that it tOund the government's de facto approach to
"depart from the specific statutory language." Byrum, 408 U.S. at 138-39. On the other hand, the Court
quite clearly was saying that even ifone applied a de facto approach, the decedent's power did not amount
to a § 2036(a)(2) power. Id. at 143 ("We conclude that Byrum did not have an unconstrained de facto
power to regulate the flow of dividends to the trust .. ; ."). That the Court found it necessary to rebut at
length the government's positim regarding the decedent's de facto power suggests some unease in relying
exclusively on its "legally enforceable right" test. Moreover, courts have frequently found it necessary in
tax and other cases to "depart from the specific statutory language" to cany out the purposes of the law.
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(2) Section 2036(a)(2) did not apply because the decedent had received adequate and
full consideration for his transfer of assets to the FLP;157 and
(3) Section 2036(a)(2) did not apply because there was no "transfer" within the
meaning of that section. I58
It is too early to tell whether any of these objections will ultimately prevail.
Until then, a planner must confront the possibility that Strangi will b~
sustained, followed, and maybe even extended. How can or should a planner
respond? Two observations can be made:
(I) The Strangi holding regarding § 2036(a)(2) apparently will apply only if a
decedent has, at the time ofhis death, the power, either alone or in conjunction
with others, to make distribution or liquidation decisions regarding the FLP.
157. Gans & Blattmacbr, supra note 5, at 1161-63; Michael D. Mulligan, Courts Err in Applying
Section 2036(a)(2) to LimitedPartnerships, 30 EsT. PLAN. 486, 490-94 (2003). The court in Strangiheld
that the decedent's transfer ofproperty to the FLP did not qualify for the exception to § 2036(a) for a "bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." Strangi II, 85 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 1343, 83 T.C.M. (RIA) 'I 2003-145, at 745-46. The court found that decedent's transferto the FLP was
not "a bona fide sale" because (1) the transfer was not conducted at arm's length and did not involve any
"meaningful negotiation or bargaining with other anticipated interest-holders and (2) "was merely a
'recycling' ofvaluethrougb partnership or corporate solution." Id. at 1344, 85 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2003-145,
at 746. Similar holdings were made in Kimbell v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 2d 700,704-05 (N.D. Tex.
2003); Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 374, 387-89, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA)
'112002-246, at 1525-27; Estate ofHarper v. Commissioner, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641,2002 T.C.M. (RIA)
'112002-121, at 722-24.
The authors ofthe above-cited articles contend the exception should be considered satisfied whenever
the amount received by the transferor equals the amount transferred, even if there is no arm's length
bargaining and the exchange is a mere "recycling." They point out that the exception is intended to exempt
transactions that do not deplete the transferer's gross estate; hence, the exception should be deemed
satisfied whenever the amounts exchanged are equal Gans & Blattmachr, supra note 5, at 1161-63;
Mulligan, supra, at 492-94. The authors assert that since the court in Strangi found there was no gift when
the decedent transferred his property to the FLP, it implicitly found that there was no depletion ofhis gross
estate and hence the exception should apply. Gans & Blattmacbr, supra note 5, at 1163.
I agree that the "adequate and full consideration" exception is satisfied whenever the amounts
exchanged are equal. However, I do not believe the exception was satisfied in Strangi. The amounts
exchanged were not equal; Strangi had transferred property worth approximately $9.9 million in return for
LP interests worth only about $6.8 millim, see supra note 76, and there would have been depletion of his
gross estate had the court not applied § 2036. But see infra note 158.
158. Mulliglln, supra note 157, at 490-92. I believe this is the best argument for attacking the court's
§ 2036(a)(2) holding in Strangi. Strangi's transfer of property in exchange for his LP interests did not
transfer any value to anyone else, either at the time of the transfer, or upon his death. See supra Part Ill.C.
Consequently, there is no reason to apply § 2036(a). There was a transfer ofvalue at Strangi's death, but
that transfer was effected by Strangi's will-not by his prior transfer to the FLP-and was fully taxable per
§ 2033. There was, of course, a "transfer" of value to the FLP, but case law and indeed a Treasury
regulation treat a transfer to an entity as taxable only to the extent that the owners or beneficiaries of the
entity (other than the transferor) benefit from the transfer. See supra note 83.
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This suggests that a partner in an existing FLP can avoid § 2036(a)(2)
simply by giving away all interests in the FLP that entitle himto participate
in distribution and liquidation decisions. However, this approach will succeed
only if the partner lives for more than three years following the gift.
Otherwise the gifted interests will be brought backinto the gross estate at their
date-of-death values pursuant to § 2035. 159 The other potential problem with
this approach is that the gift of the partner's interests may generate a gift tax
liability. However, planners have devised techniques that can mitigate and
even eliminate the potential gift tax liability.160 Thus, except for the § 2035
risk, the impact ofthe Strangi decision can probably be avoided in the case of
an existing partnership without much difficulty.
In the case of a new FLP, a favorable result could be achieved by having
the taxpayer transfer property to the FLP in exchange for LP interests and a
minority interest in the corporate general partner (i.e., the fact pattern of
Strangi), but then prohibiting the taxpayer, in the governing documents, from
participating in any distribution or liquidation decision. This could be
bolstered by prohibiting amendment of this provision (or at least, prohibiting
the taxpayer from participating in the amending process).161
If the contributing partner is married and is concerned about giving the
problematic powers to an outsider, he might place the power to make
distribution and liquidation decisions in his spouse. For example, he could
transfer his property to the FLP but provide that the GP and LP interests
159. Section 2035 provides, inter alia, that if a decedent transferred property within three years of
his death and if the value of the transferred property would have been included in the decedent's gross
estate pursuant to § 2036 had the transfer not ocwrred, the transferred property will be included in the
decedent's gross estate at its date-<Jf-death value as though the transfer did not take place. See Gans &
Blattmachr, supra note 5, at 1166-67 for a discussion of this issue in the context of an FLP.
160. Gans and Blattmachr confidently assert that "in the case ofan existing partnership, Strangi 's
alternative holding (i.e., its holding regarding § 2036(a)(2» can be easily avoided without incurring any
gift tax liability." Gans & Blattmachr, supra note 5, at 1165. One technique they describe is for the partner
to transfer his problematic interests to a trust in which the partner retains the power to modify the interests
of the beneficiaries. "The retained modification power would render the gift incomplete and would
therefore defeat the gift tax." [d. at 1164. At the same time, the partner would have divested himself of
any power to affect liquidation and distribution decisions since all voting power in the interests would
reside in the trustee. The transferred interests would be included in the partner's gross estate because of
his retained modification power but they would be valued with the appropriate discounts. However,
§ 2036(a)(2) would not apply with respect to the value of the underlying assets because the partner had
divested himself of all power over them. [d. at 1164-65.
Another approach they propose is to recapitalize the partner's interests into two classes: one class in
which all voting and liquidation rights are reposed and the other with no voting or liquidation rights. Ifthe
class having the voting and liquidation rights constituted only a modest part of the FLP's equity, say, one
percent, it could probably be given away with only a modest gift tax liability. [d. at 1164.
161. [d. at 1167-68.
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received in return be issued directly to his spouse.162 Of course, the
contributing partner and the spouse could not agree on how the spouse was to
exercise that power nor could the spouse agree to follow the directions of the
contributing partner. 163 However, assuming the contributing partner reposes
trust and confidence in his spouse, such an arrangement should help assuage
his concern about depriving himselfofsuch powers.164 Since the contributing
partner would have no power to make distribution or liquidation decisions at
the time ofhis death, § 2036(a) would not apply. 165 Moreover, there would be
no gift tax liability by virtue of the marital deduction. 166
(2) Strangi's § 2036(b)(2) holdingshould not extend to anFLP that operates an active
business
One reason that the Strangi court declined to apply Byrum was that
Byrum involved actively conducted businesses while the FLP in Strangi held
"only monetary or investment assets.,,167 This distinction bears crucially on
the issue of constraint: one who operates an active business faces many
demands for funds that significantly restrain his ability to distribute earnings
(as the Court explained in Byrum), while such constraints do not exist, or exist
to a much lesser degree, in the case of an FLP holding only monetary or
investment assets.
The court could also have justified the distinction in terms of the
"independent significance" doctrine. This doctrine, which the Service has
recognized in certain instances, holds that a power to affect beneficial
enjoyment will not be considered a taxable power if its exercise has a
162. Id. at 1168.
163. Publicker v. Miles, 48 A.F.T.R. 1968 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (holding that wife's transfer ofproperty
to trust was an incomplete gift where husband had agreed in advance that he would give his required
consent to any change she wanted in the trust); see also Camp v. Comm'r, 195 F.2d 999, 1004 (1st Cir.
1952) (stating in dictum that husband's transfer ofsecurities to wife would be a completed gift even ifhe
were "confident that his wife would reconvey the securities to him if he ever asked for them" but that
situation would be different if"there were an advance agreement" that wife would acquiesce to any change
desired by husband).
164. Gans & Blattmachr, supra note 5, at 1168.
165. /d. Gans and Blattmachralso assert that§ 2035 should not apply even ifthe contributing partner
dies within three years of the issuance of the partnership interests, because he never possessed those
interests. Id. at 1169. However, the Service could argue that initially the interests were constructively
issued to the contributing partner and were constructively retransferred by him to his spouse. If that
argument were successful, § 2035 would apply if the contributing partner died within three years of his
contribution.
166. Id. at 1168; see also I.RC. § 2523.
167. Strangi 11,85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1342,2003 T.C.M. (RIA) '112003-145, at 744.
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significance that is independent of its effect on such enjoyment. Thus, the
Service ruled in the case ofa trust that distributed its income equally among
the grantor's children, including after-born children, that the grantor's ability
to have additional children and thereby reduce the amount oftrust income paid
to his current children was neither a § 2036 power nor a § 2038 power, since
having additional children had a significance that is independent of its effect
on the distribution oftrust income. 168 Likewise, deciding to distribute income
ofan active business affects not only the amount of income the owners of the
business receive (i.e., their enjoyment ofthe property) but also the amount of
money available for expansion ofthe business, the replacement ofequipment
and machinery, the ability to pay sufficient compensation needed to attract
competent employees and executives, etc. In contrast, the effect of deciding
to distribute income from a securities portfolio is principally confined to its
effect on the recipient's current and future enjoyment of the property.
The constraints imposed by the operation ofan active business shouldbe
sufficient to prevent the application of§ 2036(a)(2). Nevertheless, one should
keep in mind the possibility that the courts, motivated by a desire to rein in
abusive FLPs, may refuse to apply Byrum unless all three of the following
conditions are satisfied: (I) an independent trustee with a discretionary power
to make distributions is interposed between the FLP and the beneficiaries;
(2) the FLP consists solely of an active business; and (3) the FLP has a
significant number of nonfamily partners.
G. Conclusion
Reports of the FLP's demise have been greatly exaggerated. On every
issue discussed but § 2036, the authorities are favorable to the taxpayer, and
even § 2036 can apparently be avoided if the FLP is properly structured.
Some of the precautions needed to avoid § 2036(a)(2) (e.g., relinquishing
power over distribution and liquidation decisions) will make FLPs less
attractive to some taxpayers, but FLPs still offer substantial tax benefits and
thus are likely to remain popular.
168. Rev. Rul. 80-255, 1980-2 C.B. 272; see also Rev. Rul. 72-307, 1972-1 C.B. 307 (holding that
an employee's ability to tenninate his coverage under his employer's group lire insurance po1icyby quitting
his job was not an "incident ofownership" under § 2042, since quitting his j ob had a significance that was
independent of his coverage under the policy).
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IV. SHOULD THE LAW ON DISCOUNTS BE REFORMED? IF SO, How?
Part II showed that the "fair market value" standard often understates the
value ofFLP interests, and that the lack ofcontrol used to justify the discount
is often only temporary. Part III showed that current doctrine--even as
extended by Strangi- is unlikely to end the use ofFLPs. Thus, the need for
reform must be addressed. This Part describes and critiques the two most
popular reform proposals and concludes by making a new proposal.
A. The Attribution Approach
Under the "attribution approach," a transferee ofan interest in an entity
is treated for valuation purposes as owning interests that are actually owned
by other members of his family.'69 For example, the transferee might be
treated as owning the interests owned by his spouse, siblings, parents,
children, and grandchildren. This approach would substantially reduce the
possibility ofan interest qualifying for a minority or lack-of~ontrol discount.
Suppose Ts father, F, owns 30% of ABC Corp. 's stock; his aunt A (Fs
sister), owns 20%; his uncle U (his mother's brother) owns 40%; and his
cousin C (Us child) owns 10%. Under the attribution rule suggested above
and assuming reattribution, F s gift of 10% ofthe company's stock to Twould
not qualify for a minority discount, since T, in addition to the 10% stock
interest he received as a gift, would also be treated as owning all the
remaining stock in the company. 170
The rationale for this approach is that members of the same family
generally cooperate with one another and act in concert as a single control
group. Thus, its proponents assert, it is unrealistic to value an interest owned
by a family member as though it were held by an unrelated outsider.
169. The attribution approach is discussed in Laura E. Cunningham, Remember the Alamo: The IRS
Needs Ammunition in Its Fight Against FLP, 86 TAX NOTES 1461, 1466-67 (2000), and in Fellows &
Painter, supra note 8, at 927-28.
170. Reattribution means that an interest that is constructively owned by a person under the
attribution rules is consideredactuallyowned bythat person forpurposes ofreapplyingthe attribution rules.
In the example in the tat, the ten percent interest actually owned by C is attributed to U since U is C's
parent That ten percent interest, which is now considered actually owned by U, is reattributed to Ts
mother, since Ts mother is U's sibling. Finally, the ten percent interest, which is now considered actually
owned by Ts mother, is reattributed to T under the parent-ehild attribution rule. A similar process of
attribution and reattribution causes all the remaining stock owned by Ts family to be treated as owned by
T.
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The House of Representatives passed an attribution rule like the one
described above as part of the 1987 Omnibus Reconciliation Act, but neither
the Senate nor the Conference Committee adopted it l71 The attribution
approach has attracted onlyminimal support from the commentators. ln Many
have rejected it, contending that the attribution approach makes assumptions
about family solidarity that are often unjustified. 173 In the words of one
commentator, "[f]or every family owned business in which siblings and in-
laws cooperate and work as an economic unit, there is apt to be one in which
relationships are strained, and cooperation is lacking."174
B. The Aggregation Approach
Under the "aggregation approach" a transferred interest is valued on the
basis of its pro rata share of the fair market value of the transferor's entire
interest 175 Thus, ifP owns 80% ofthe stock in a corporation and gives a 10%
stock interest in it to C, his child, the value of the gifted interest for tax
purposes would be one~ighth (i.e., 10% out of80%) of the fair market value
of an 80% stock interest (i.e., P's initial interest).'76 Even though C receives
171. See H.R. REp. No. 100-391, at 1041-44 (1987); H.R. CONF. REp. No. 100-495, at 994-95
(1987).
172. ProfessorCooper tentatively suggested enactment ofan attribution approach. See Cooper,supra
note 35, at 232 ("In the case ofminority discounts lhis [reform] might be accomplished by incorporating
an attribution concept such as that embodied in present [§] 318 into the valuation determination."). No
other commentator appears to have endorsed lhis approach.
173. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 169, at 1471; Fellows & Painter, supra note 8, at 928
("Application of the attribution rUles, however, may create harsh results.").
174. Cunningham, supra note 169, at 1471.
175. The "aggregation approach" is discussed in Fellows & Painter, supra note 8, at 922-26, and
Cunningham, supra note 169, at 1467-68. Professor Dodge has recommended enactment ofan aggregation
approach under which all gifts and testamentary transrersof fractional interests in property (e.g., shares in
a corporation, FLP interests) would be taxed at death. Joseph M. Dodge,Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes
AlongEasy-to-Value Lines, 43 TAX 1. REv. 241, 254-56, 374-76 (1988). Their valuation wrold be based
on the largest fractional interest that the decedent ever owned in that property. Id. at 255, 374-75. The
Treasury proposed the adoption of an aggregation approach in 2 TREASURY DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR
FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 386-88 (1984). The Treasury's proposal was
supplemented by an attribution rule under which stock ownedby thetransreror's sprose would beattributed
to the transferor. Id. at 387.
176. The Treasury explained the operation of its proposed aggregate approach by the following two
examples:
Example 1. A owns 60% of the outstanding stock of a corporation worth $100x. A, whose
controlling interest is worth $70x, transrers one-half of his interest to B. The value of the gift for
gift tax purposes is $35x (i.e., 50% of the value of A's 60% block of stock). If A retains his
remaining 30% block until his death, the estate tax value ofsuch block will be 50"10 ofthe value of
a 60% block of stock at the date ofA's death.
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only 10% of the corporation's stock, the gift will not qualify for a minority
discount because it is valued on the basis ofP' s 80% majority stock interest.
Unlike the attribution approach, the aggregation approach values property
solely on the basis ofproperty that is, or was, owned by the transferor. 177 In
contrast, the attribution approach values property by reference to the holdings
of both the transferor and his family. 178
The reach ofthe aggregation approach is extremelybroad and extends far
beyond exotic transactions involving FLPs. It applies whenever a person
transfers a part interest in his property to someone else. Thus, it applies when
a sole proprietor gives away a partial interests in his business to one or more
donees. It applies regardless of how small the transferred interest is or
whether it carries any voting rights.
C. Critique ofthe Aggregation Approach
As will become clear from the following discussion, I oppose the
aggregation approach principally because it makes unwarranted assumptions
about family cohesiveness. Afortiori, I oppose the attribution approach since
it makes even more sweeping assumptions on that issue. The following
discussion will therefore be limited to a critique ofthe aggregation approach,
since the criticisms I make of the aggregation approach also apply to the
attribution approach-only with more force.
(1) Eliminating a Discontinuity Between the Estate Tax and the Gift Tax
Some proponents ofthe aggregation approach justify it primarily on the
ground that it eliminates a discontinuity in the tax treatment of gifts and
Example 2. B owns 40% of the outstanding stock of a corporation worth $1 OOx. B's minority
interest is worth $30x, and B transfers one-halfofher interest to A. The value ofthe gift to A would
be $15x (i.e., 50% of the value of the 40"10 block possessed by B immediately prior to the gift).
However, ifB's spouse S owned stock representing 20% of the corporation, so that the combined
interest ofSand B was worth $75x, the value ofthe gift to A would be $25x, (i.e., 33 1/3% of the
value of the 60% block held jointly by Band S).
TREASURY DEP'T,supra note 175, at 387. The second ex.ample shows the effect oftheTreasury's proposed
spousal attribution rule.
177. Where the taxpayer has made a number oftransfers, some donative and others for consideration,
and has also made a number of acquisitions, application of the aggregation approach can become very
complicated: See Fellows & Painter, supra note 8, at 926 n.1 02.
178. Ofcourse, the scope ofthe attributim could be narrowed ifthat were desired For example, the
attribution rule could provide that there is no attribution between siblings as § 318(a)(I)(a) of the Code
does.
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testamentary transfers. I79 They point out, correctly, that the gift tax is imposed
on the value of the interest received by each donee, while the estate tax is
imposed on the value of the entire interest passing under the decedent's
estate. 180 Suppose Downs 80% of the stock of ABC, Inc., and gives halfof
his stock to son, A, and the other half to his daughter, B. Each gift will be
valued separately and therefore will qualify for a lack-of-control discount
because each is a minority interest On the other hand, ifD had retained his
80% stock interest for life and willed 40% ofthe stock to A and the other 40%
to B, there would be no lack-of-control discount because the total amount
passing though D's estate, 80%, was a controlling interest.
Proponents point out that historically the primary purpose of the gift tax
was to serve as a backstop for the estate tax by taxing transfers that depleted
the amountthat would otherwise be subjectto estate tax. 181 Current law, they
argue, is inconsistent with this purpose, because it taxes a smaller amount if
the transfer is made by lifetime gift than would be taxed if the transfer were
made at death.
Changes made in the law in 200I have significantly weakened the
"backstop-to-the-estate-tax" rationale for the gift tax. Under those changes,
the estate tax ends in 2010 while the gift tax continues in effect. I82 ObviousIy,
the gift tax cannot serve as a "backstop" for an estate tax that no longer exists.
Moreover, from 2004 through 2009, the estate tax "exclusion amount" (i.e.,
the amount sheltered from estate tax by the unified credit) increases from
$1,500,000 to $3,500,000 while the gift tax exclusion amount remains fixed
at one million dollars. 183 The difference in the two exclusion amounts in any
given year constitutes the amount of wealth that can be transferred tax free
that year by a testamentary disposition but which would be subject to gift tax
179. Cunningham, supra note 169, at 1462-63, Repetti,supra note 8, at 417 ("Thisphenomenon [i.e.,
tax savings derived by making gift ofminority interests] results from a fundamental discontinuity between
the estate tax and the gift taxes.").
180. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Sanford v. Cornrn'r, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (I 939)("An important, ifnot the main, purpose
ofthe gift tax was to prevent orcompensate fur avoidanceofdeath taxes by taxing the gifts ofproperty inter
vivos which, but for the gifts, would be subject in its original or converted form to the tax laid upon
transfers at death.").
182. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of2001,Pub. L No. 107-16, § SOl, 115
Stat. 38, 69 (2001). An changes made by that Act, including repeal of the estate tax, will cease to be
effective as ofJanuary I, 2011, and 1he Code will revert to the way it was before the Act became effective.
[d. § 90I, liS Stat. at ISO. This "sunset" provision was adopted to ensure that the Act complied with the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-84, at 325-26 (2001).
183. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 521, 115
Stat. 38, 71-72 (2001).
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iftransferred by.an inter vivos gift. Clearly, the gift tax does not backstop the
estate tax for amounts that are not subject to the estate taX. 184
In any event, elimination ofa discontinuity between the estate tax and the
gift tax is an insufficient justification for the aggregation approach. To
prevail, the proponents of this approach must do more than point out the
discontinuity; they must demonstrate the superiority of the estate tax rule. In
fact, the gift tax rule appears superior.
First, the gift tax rule is more consistent with the nature and underlying
rationale of a transfer tax. A "transfer" is a conveyance of something from
one person to another. 18S Both the estate tax and the gift tax are taxes on the
transfer of value. The tax should be imposed on the value that is actually
conveyed to the transferee. 186 The estate tax rule, however, may tax value that
is not transferred.
Consider the case described above where the decedent owned 80% ofthe
stock in ABC, Inc. and bequeathed halfofhis interest to A and the other half
toB. Assume that the decedent's 80% interest had a value of$200,000 in his
hands. Let's also assume arguendo that the value ofeach legatee's interest in
their respective hands is only $80,000 (rather than $100,000), because their
respective interests lack control. (Whether the discounts accurately value an
interest passing to a taxpayer where the other interests are held by members
ofhis family will be discussed in Part IV.Co2 below.) On these assumptions,
the decedent's estate has transferred only $160,000 ofvalue but estate tax will
be computed as though it had transferred $200,000 of value. The $40,000
difference was not "transferred" but vanished or was destroyed in the process
ofbeing transferred.
184. It is generally assumed that the reasons for retaining the gift tax were (1) to reduce the overall
revenue loss caused by the legislation and (2) to discourage taxpayers from shifting income from one
taxpayer to another in an attempt to reduce their overall income tax liability. Henry J. Lischer, Jr.,
Incomplete Transfer Tax Repeal: Should the Gift Tax Survive?, 56 SMUL.REv. 601,610-12 (2003). This
may also explain why the exclusion amounts during the period 2004 through 2009 are smaller for gifts than
for testamentary transfers.
185. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, REVISED EDITION (1988) defines "transfer" as
meaning "to convey ... from one ... person, etc., to another."
186. In the following cases, the court valued property fur estate tax purposes on the value that passed
to the estate rather than its value in the hands of the decedent: United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th
Cir. 1962) (disregarding agreement that permitted other partners to buy decedent's interest at two-thirds
ofits calculated value that tenninatedupon decedent's death); Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.
1957) (disregarding possibility of forfeiture that lapsed at decedent's death); Estate of Harrison v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306, 1987 T.C.M.(RIA) '1187,008 (disregarding decedent's power of
liquidation that lapsed at his death).
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Second, the gift tax approach is more equitable. In the above example,
the amount of estate tax imposed on the stock interests passing to A and D,
which have a combined value of $160,000, will be the same as the tax
imposed on a $200,000 bequest ofcash. This is highly inequitable, especially
if each legatee is required to pay the estate tax on his legacy under the
applicable tax apportionment provision. I 87
Third, the existing estate tax rule can result in the seeming absurdity
where a bequest that qualifies as a deduction (e.g., a charitable or marital
bequest) is included inthe taxable estate, and therefore is taxed, at a different
value than the amount of the corresponding deduction. In Ahmanson
Foundation v. United States; 88 nonvoting shares bequeathed to a charitywere
included in the gross estate without a lack-of-control discount (since the estate
also held all the voting shares of the corporation),'89 while the charitable
deduction for the same bequest was reduced by a lack-of-control discount 190
This discrepancy does not occur under the gift tax approach, because both the
amount ofthe gift and the amount ofthe deduction will be discounted for lack
of control.
Finally, the proponents of the aggregation approach exaggerate the
difference between the gift tax approach and the estate tax approach. In fact,
the estate tax approach is fully consistent with the gift tax approach if one
views the estate-rather than the ultimate recipient of the property-as the
decedent's transferee. In the above example, a controlling 80% stock interest
passed to the estate, and ifone views the estate as the transferee, no discount
should be allowed for lack of control. This way of looking at the matter
makes sense if the executor has the .power to sell the entire 800!o interest for
then the estate can realize the full value of the bloc as a controlling interest.
On the other hand, where the decedent carves up his controlling interest into
187. The Uniform Probate Code states that unless the will provides otherwise, each beneficiary of
the estate is liable for the estate tax attributable to the interest he received. The amount ofthe beneficiary's
liability is determined by using the values that were used in computing the tax. UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 3-916(b) (amended 1998),8 (Pt. 2) U.LA 284 (2003). Under this approach, A and B in the example in
the text would collectively have to pay the same amount of tax as the recipient ofa $200,000 bequest, even
though the combined value of their respective stock interests was only $160,000.
188. 674 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981).
189. Id. at 765-69.
190. Id. at 771-72. In Estate o/Chenoweth v. Commissioner, the decedent bequeathed 51% of his
stock in a cOlporatim to his wife and the remaining 49% to his daughter. 88 T.C. 1577 (1987). The bequest
to his wife qualified for the marital deductim. The court recognized the possibility that the bequest might
be included in the estate at one value while it might be valued at a diffurent amount in computing the
marital deduction. Id. at 1589-90. Contra Provident Nat'l Bank v. United States, 581 F.2d 1081, 1091-92
(3d Cir. 1978).
HeinOnline -- 1 Pitt. Tax Rev. 198 2003-2004
198 PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW [Vol. 1:155
multiple minority interests and bequeaths them to different beneficiaries, as
in the above example, the executor normally lacks a powerofsale. 191 Then
the estate cannot realize the value of the 80010 bloc as a controlling interest,
and the case for viewing the estate as the transferee is much weaker.
There may be reasons for always treating the estate-rather than the
ultimate recipients-as the transferee of all property passing through the
probate estate. Deciding whether the executor has a power of sale in a given
case may be costly and time consuming. It may require a construction ofthe
will, and may depend on the state's law on abatement, the state's preference
(or lack thereof) for in-kind distributions, whether a bequest is characterized
under state law as a general or specific bequest, etc.192 The present rule,
which treats all property passing under the will uniformly, canbe defended on
the basis of administrative convenience. However, these reasons, which are
due to the nature ofestate administration, do not justify applying the estate tax
rule to inter vivos gifts where the rule for valuing interests passing to
individual donees is more equitable and consistent with the nature ofa transfer
tax.
(2) Does the Aggregation Approach Accurately Value the Transferred
Property?
Proponents of the aggregation approach assert that allowing lack~f­
control discounts significantlyunderstates the true value ofbusiness interests.
This notion is based on the "happy family" scenario previously described in
this article. 193 In the happy family scenario, family members act in harmony
with each other for the good of the business. The views of each member are
taken into account in the running of the business and are accorded respect.
The needs of all family members are considered in determining possible
distribution of earnings. In light of these benefits, a family member has no
desire to sell notwithstanding his minority status. Consequently, the price at
which he could sell his interest is of little moment to him. If a decision is
191. Under the Uniform Probate Code, a legatee ofa specific devise is entitled to distribution of the
thing devised to him. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-906(a)(1) (amended 1987),8 (Pt. 2) U.LA 272 (2003).
Moreover, unless the will provides otherwise, specific devises are the last categoryoftestamentary transfers
to be liable fur payment of administration expenses and debts. [d. § 3-902(a) (1969), 8 (Pt. 2) U.L.A. 268
(2003).
192. See generally WILLIAM M.McGoVERN,JR. &SHELDONF. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
§§ 8.2, 12.6 (2d ed. 200 I).
193. See infra Part II.C2.
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made to sell the business, he will be included in the selling group and thus will
not suffer a minority discount for lack ofcontrol.
Unfortunately, as anyone familiar with family businesses can attest, the
optimistic assumptions that underlie the happy family scenario are frequently
not true. Judge Posner commented on a case where a donor had divided
shares in a corporation equally among his children:
[I]t was speculative whether ... (the grantor's children) would pull together, or, as is not
uncommon in closely held corporations, pull apart. Since it is hard to sell stock in a
closely held corporation to outsiders, there may be no easy solution if the siblings
bicker.... [T]he possibility ofbickering and dissension within a family can never be
excluded. 194
Likewise, a consultant to family businesses has noted that "[g]reat battles go
on in family businesses" and that "[f]ew businesses have profits to share after
these lengthy internecine wars.,,195 The same consultant further noted that
there are "countless stories of heirs to family fortunes or businesses who
cannot agree on anything, who simply end up 'pulling and tugging' at each
other like siblings or cousins at a family picnic ...."196
Another business consultant states that "[f]amily discord is a primary
factor preventing an estimated 65% ofall family businesses from passing onto
the next generation, according to figures obtained from the Wharton School
at the University ofPennsylvania."197
The fact that a business is a "family" business often exacerbates, rather
than ameliorates, disputes that inevitably arise in the course ofbusiness. In
such cases, the business dispute is intensified by, and joined with, unresolved
emotional issues within the family which the family members themselves may
not even be aware of:
Members of a family ... quite often are fighting about deeper issues than the ones they
claim to be incensed about. . . . [I]t is never true that family members need only
understandone another's positions,common interests, and respective differences to wolk
rationally together toward an optimal resolution. Often, unfortunately, their reasons for
sustaining their conflict-reasons probably not even clear to themselves-are stronger
than their ostensible desires to resolve it. 198
194. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Comrn'r, 839 F.2d 1249, 1252-53 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis
added).
195. DAVID BaRK, FAMILY BUSINESS, RISKY BUSINESS: How TO MAKE IT WORK 78 (1985).
196. !d. at 118.
197. Howard Kapilofl; Simplifying Business Succession: Understanding Family Dynamics Is the
Key to a Smooth Transition, 22 FIN. PLAN. 48 (1993).
198. Kenneth Kaye, Penetrating the Cycle ofSustained Conflict, Bus. HORIZONS, Spring 1991,
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The aggregation approach is likely to apply to transactions that involve
the two most troubled relationships: child-parent and sibling-sibling. In the
st~reotypical FLP scenario, one or both parents form an FLP and then give LP
interests to their children, retaining for themselves the controlling GP interest.
nus, implementation of the standard FLP plan divides the family business
between parent(s) and one or more children, and if LP interests are given to
more than one child, between siblings. A huge body of literature exists on the
problems arising when parents and children are involved in the family
business.
Consider the parent-child relationship. One ofthe most common sources
of conflict in a family business occurs where the parent and a child (or
children) work together in the business the parent founded. 199 The parent may
view the business as an extension of himself, the source of his gratification
and achievement,. and a monument to his life's work.20o As a result, he is
reluctant to let go and characteristically has great difficulty in delegating. 201
The parent is resentful as the child seeks greater responsibility, viewing him
as a threat to his continued authority. In tum, the child is resentful of the
parent who, he feels, is keeping him in an infantile role with the
"accompanying contempt, condescension[,] and lack of confidence" that
frequently characterize the parent's attitude in these situations.202 The result
of these conflicting emotional currents is that the child--contrary to the
assumption underlying the happy family scenario--is given no real authority
or say in the running of the business. Moreover, the parent's failure to give
reprinted in FAMILY BUSINESS SOURCEBOOK II355, 369-70 (Craig. E ArcmoffetaI. OOs., 1996)[hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK II].
199. John Davis & Renato Tagiuri, Life Stages and Father-Son Work Relationships, reprinted in
SOURCEBOOK II, supra note 198, at 421; Harry Levinson, Conflicts That PlagueFamily Businesses, HARV.
Bus. REv., Mar-Apr. 1971 ,reprintedin SOURCEBOOK II, supra note 198, at 378-79; PeterS. Davis & Paula
D. HarvestOll,In the Founder 's Shadow: Conflict in the Family Firm, 12 FAM.Bus.REV. 311,314,318-19
(I 999)(finding statistically-significant greater cmflict when founder is present than when he is not); Jim
Grote, Conflicting Generations: A New Theory ofFamily Business Rivalry, 16 FAM. Bus. REV. 113,
118-20 (2003).
. 200. Levinson,supra note 199, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK II, supra note 198, at 378-79; Grote, supra
note 199, at 118·20.
201. Levinson, supra note 199, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK II, supra note 198 at 379; Grote, supra
note 199, at 119. Ivan Lansberg describes the "powerful emotional undercurrents" unleashed by the
prospect of a transfer of power from senior leadership to a younger generation. IVAN LANSBERG,
SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS 249, 251-55 (1999). He describes two types of leaders, ''monarchs'' and
"genemls," who are ''unable to surrender control of their companies in earnest" and two types,
"ambassadors" and "governors," who are able to leave "gmcefully and constructively." Id. at 256.
202. Levinson, supra note 199, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK II, supra note 198, at 379.
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the child real authority may mean that no one will be trained to take over the
business when the parent finally departs the business, and as a result, the value
of the business declines.203
Likewise, conflict among siblings is common.204 Interestingly, some
proponents of the aggregation approach reject the attribution approach
because of the likelihood of conflict between and among siblings. Two
proponents rejected the attribution approach because family cooperation is
"ephemeral and cannot always be presumed," citing the famous New York
case of In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc./os which involved a bitter dispute
between a brother and a sister.206 Another proponent of the aggregation.
approach rejected the attribution approach because "[f]or every family owned
business in which siblings and in·laws cooperate and work as an economic
unit, there is apt to be one in which relationships are strained, and cooperation
is lacking."207 What these proponents seemingly overlook is that the
aggregation approach will frequently apply where transfers are made to
siblings. The aggregation approach may therefore have its greatest impact in
the case of the very relationship that they find so problematic.
Some may feel that the conflicts described above are unlikely to occur
because a donor will not give interests in his business to donees with whom
he foresees future conflicts.208 Unfortunately, this facile assumption is often
not the case. First, the donor is unlikely to be overly concerned about
potential conflicts so long as he retains absolute control ofthe entity. This of
course is true in the typical FLP scenario where the parent gives his child or
children nonvoting LP interests but retains the controlling GP interest
Moreover, conflict may develop that the donor did not foresee. Furthermore,
the "no-conflict assumption" overlooks the highly ambivalent relationship
between the parent and his child.209 The parent loves the child and wants him
203. [d. at 378.
204. See id. at 382-83. Conflicts involving siblings are described and discussed in Kaye, supra note
198, and Richard B. Peiser & Leland M. Wooten, Life-Cycle Changes in Small Family Businesses, Bus.
HORIZONS, May/June 1983, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK II, supra note 198, at 346,349.
205. 119 N.E.2d 563 (N.Y. 1954).
206. Fellows & Painter, supra note 8, at 928 n.l07.
207. Cunningham, supra note 169, at 1461, 1471; see also Fellows & Painter, supra note 8,at 928
("Application ofthe attribution rules, however, may create harsh results.").
208. This is apparently the position of Professors Fellows and Painter who, in support of the
aggregation approach, argued that 'tm]ajority owners ofclose corporations generally do not give stock to
persons with interests adverse to the donor's interest." Fellows & Painter, supra note 8, at 922 n.93.
209. The parent frequently has highly ambivalent fedings toward the child in these situations.
Consciously, the parent wants the child to succeed, but unconsciously the parent "does not want his [child]
to win, take away his combination baby and mistress, and displace him fron1 his summit position."
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to succeed. Thus, he gives him interests in the business. At the same time, he
is resentful and fearful of the child's taking over and displacing him in the
business he built and developed; hence theconflict.2IO This ambivalence is
often the key dynamic in the parent-child relationship and has been noted by
many researchers. Finally, even ifrelations between the donor and the donees
are, and remain, good, conflict may exist or develop between the donees.211
This frequently occurs where a parent divides his business among his
children.212
Even if the happy family scenario exists, a family member's
noncontrolling interest is still less valuable to him than a controlling interest.
Since he lacks control, he cannot unilaterally implement his views on how the
business should be run. Implementation of his views is dependent upon his
ability to persuade others, and he may not always succeed in doing this.
Moreover, even if one assumes that the family member's views,
aspirations and needs are identical to those. who control the business-and
thus his lack of control makes no immediate difference to him-his
noncontrolling interest still lacks the value ofa controlling interest. People's
attitudes, interests, and monetary needs change over time. A holder of a
noncontrolling interest who is employed by the company and is receiving
compensation may be perfectly content with a policy of plowing all the
earnings back into the business. However, after retirement when he ceases to
receive compensation, he might want the business to distribute earnings to him
to recompense him for his lost income. A person who controls the business
could change the business' policy to conform to his changingneeds. A person
holding a noncontrolling interest cannot. His inability to unilaterally
determine policy, combined with his inability to realize "fair" value on a sale
of his noncontrolling interest, constitute real limitations on the value of his
interest. The fact is that valuing a noncontrolling interest as if its holder had
control-the effect of the aggregation approach-will almost inevitably
overvalue that interest.
Levinson, supra note 199, reprinted in SOU RCE BOOK II, supra note 198, at 379; see also Grote, supra note
199, at 118-19 (noting that the parent frequently sends out double messages to the child, e.g., be assertive
and succeed but at the same time do not upstage me).
210. See supra notes 199-203, 209 and accompanying text.
211. One study showed there was greater conflict in a family finn when headed by a second-
generation member than when it was headed by the founder, although the difference was not statistically
significant. Davis & Harveston, supra note 199, at 317. However, conflict was found to increase
significantly as control of the business passed from the second generation to the third generation. [d. at
317-19; see also supra notes 204-07.
212. See Davis & Harveston, supra note 199, at 317-19; see also supra notes 204-07.
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On the other hand, current law, which values a family member's
noncontrolling interest as though the member were an outsider, will almost
always undervalue the interest. In many cases, the holder's status as a family
member will make his noncontrolling interest more valuable to him than it
would be to an outsider. The gap between the actual value transferred and the
value as determined under current law is likely to be especially large when the
FLP was formed as part of the decedent's estate plan. It is simply incredible
that taxpayers engage in transactions, on the advice of their business and tax
advisors, that result in a 30% or more loss of value. Such taxpayers must
believe that the value they are conveying exceeds the discounted value
reportable for tax purposes; otherwise they would not undertake the
transaction.
The ideal solution, of course, would be to value the interest as under
current law and then increase it by the additional value, ifany, attributable to
the transferee's family status. This would require, among other things:
identifying and evaluating the nature and quality of the transferee's
relationships with other members ofhis family,particularly those involved in
the business; the strength or fragility of those relationships; the extent to
which the business is currently satisfying the transferee's economic and other
needs and aspirations; and the extent to which the transferee's opinions are
given weight in business decisions. An analysis of the time and manner in
which these factors are likely to change would also be needed. For example,
a transferee may currently have good relations with his parent who founded
the business, but will he get along. with his siblings who will control the
business when his parent is no longer involved? . After this analysis is
completed, these items would somehowhave to be quantified. Obviously, this
is virtually an impossible task. Not surprisingly, no one seems to have
recommended this approach.
Thus it appears that we must choose between two imperfect valuation
methods: either allowing the discount in full or disallowing it in full. How
can we decide which method to use iIi a way that is fair to both the taxpayer
and the government?
D. A Proposed Solution
(1) The Primary Purpose Approach
This article proposes that discounts for lack of control and lack of
marketability arising from the use of the FLP or other entity should be
disallowed if the taxpayer's primary purpose for using the entity to make his
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gratuitous transfers is to qualify the transfers for a valuation discount. (This
approach will sometimes be referred to as the "primary purpose" approach.)
The taxpayer would have the burden of proof under this test because of his
greater knowledge of, and easier access to, the facts. This primary purpose
approach is supplemented by special rules that take effect when a transferee
obtains control. These rules are discussed in Part IV.D.4 below.
(2) Examples ofIts Application
The following examples illustrate how the primary purpose test would be
applied.
Case I-The Inactive Party
P has owned and operated his business as a limited liability company
(LLC) for the past ten years, and he now wishes to retire and turn the business
. over to his children. P has two children: A, who has both the aptitude and
desire to work in the business, and B, who has neither. P wants to treat his
children fairly but is hesitant to entrust the future of the business to B. P
resolves his conundrum by giving A and B each a 50% interest in the LLC.
However, A's interest is a voting interest and therefore a controlling interest,
.while B's is a nonvoting interest and thus a noncontrolling interest.
As shown above, B's interest is less valuable than A's given its lack of
control, but no recognition is given to this fact under the aggregation
approach. B's interest will be valued exactlythe same asA' s (i.e., one-halfthe
value of a one hundred percent interest).213 In contrast, B's interest would
qualify for a lack-of-control discount under the approach reconunended in this
article, since P's primary purpose for using the LLC was not to create a lack-
of-control discount for B's interest; rather, his primary intent was to treat his
children equitably and in a manner that would also protect the business.
A's .and· B's interests will each qualify for a lack-of-marketability
discount, since P did not use the LLC to create a lack-of-marketability
discount. Interests in a cloSely-held business are always difficult to market,
and it makes no difference whether the interests are in the form of corporate
stock, partnership interests, or limited liability company interests.
Case II-Where Loss ofValue Is Inherent in the Dispositive Plan
Assume the same facts as above in Case I exceptthatP has three children,
each of whom is competent and anxious to work in the family business. As
before, P wishes to treat each ofchildren equally, and he therefore gives each
213. See Part lV.C.2.
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child a one-third voting interest in the LLC. Since each child has only a one-
third voting interest and thus lacks control, each of their respective interests
is less valuable than one-third the value ofP's one hundred percent interest
before he made the gifts. Nevertheless, under the aggregation approach, each
one-third interest would be valued at one-third the value of a one hundred
percent interest. In contrast, each of their interests would qualify for a lack-
of-control discount under the primary purpose approach, since P's primary
purpose in using the LLC was not to create lack~f-control discounts. Lack
of control, and its resultant effect on value, did not arise from P's use of the
LLC but was inherent in his dispositive plan.
Case Ill-The Investment FLP
Suppose P transfers her portfolio of publicly traded securities worth
$10,000,000 to an FLP taking back 99010 LP interests and a 1% GP interest.
P values the LP interests at substantial discounts for both lack of control and
lack of marketability. Using their discounted value, P gives away each year
as many LP units as she can without generating a gift tax.
P will fmd it difficult to satisfy the primary purpose test. P, through her
use of the FLP, has created two discounts where none existed before. Had P
made an outright gift of her securities, the donee would acquire complete
control over them, and the securities themselves would be marketable.
However P, through her use of the FLP, has managed to give her donee an
interest that both lacks marlcetability and control (i.e., over the securities).
Why did P take this route that purportedly results in less value for the
donee when she could have easily made an outright gift of the securities
without any loss of value? The natural conclusion is that P must have
believed that the actual loss in value was far less than the amount determined
under current law and that she was using the FLP primarily to avoid gift and
estate tax.
P still has the opportunity to rebut this conclusion by showing that her use
of the FLP was primarily for nontax purposes. One should, however, be
cautious in weighing her asserted purposes, since frequently those objectives
can be achieved in a manner that does not result in either a lack-of-
marketability or a lack~f-control discount
For example, P may be concerned that the donee lacks investment skills
and thus is hesitant to give the donee investment power over the underlying
securities. However, P can satisfy this concern by transferring her securities
to a trust in which the donee is the beneficiary and by vesting the investment
powers in an experienced fiduciary. P herself can be the trustee without
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adverse tax consequences as long as her discretionary power is limited to
investment and other management powers.214
P may justify her use of the FLP because of her desire to protect her gift
from the claims of the donee's creditors. However, asset protection can also
be achieved by giving her donee an interest in a spendthrift trust, a support
trust, or a discretionary trust.215
P may argue that by using the FLP she has managed to keep her portfolio
intact, and this makes it possible to have larger and more profitable
investments. In contrast, an outright gift ofsome ofher securities would split
up the fund available for investment into smaller units that would be incapable
of making such large-scale investments. One would be justifiably skeptical
of this purported reason unless P had previously made such large-scale
investments and unless they had produced superior returns. Moreover, giving
the underlying securities to the donee either as outright gifts or in trust would
not preclude joint investments with P when and if the opportunity arose.
Case IV-The Active Business
Father, F, transfers his unincorporated business worth $4,000,000 to an
FLP and takes back a 1% GP interest and 99010 LP interests. F's daughter,D,
is working in the business and F intends for D to take it over when he dies or
retires.
During each of the last three years, F has given D an LP interest that
represents approximately $34,000 of underlying value in the business but
which, after discounts for lack of marketability and control, is valued at
$22,000. F's wife, W, consents to havingF's gifts toDtreated as being made
one-halfby her. By virtue of the $11,000 annual exclusion, no portion of the
gift is taxable.
Absent any other evidence, no discount for lack of control will be
allowed. The apparent purpose of the FLP's capitalization is to enable F to
transfer control to D and still claim a discount for lack of control on gifts to
her representing approximately 99% of the FLP's equity (i.e., the gifts ofLP
interests). F's primary purpose in using the FLP to carry out this plan is to
214. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
215. A spendthrift trust provides that a beneficiary's interest in income and/or principal is neither
assignable by him nor subject to the claims of his creditors. 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM
FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 152-53 (4th ed. 1987). A support trust provides that the
beneficiary shall be paid only so much income as is needed for his support. Id. § 154. A discretionary trust
provides that the beneficiary shall be paid only so much income as the trustee in his absolute discretion
determines. Id. In many states, the creditors ofa beneficiary may not attach his interest in the above types
of trusts. However, the degree ofprotection afforded the beneficiary varies widely from state to state. Id.
§§ 152-57.
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reduce his transfer tax liability. F would still be entitled to a discount for lack
ofmarketability since this discount does not arise from the use ofthe FLP but
is inherent in the disposition of any interest in a closely-held business.
Suppose F also makes gifts of LP interests to his son, S. S is a college
professor and has no interest in entering F's business. F does not intend to
give S any GP interest in the FLP, since he believes that an inactive equity
holder should not be permitted to "interfere" with those actually running the
business. He is giving LP interests to S because he wants to treat all of his
children equitably. Under these facts, the gifts ofthe LP interests to S would
qualify for a lack-of-control discount, since F's principal purpose in using the
FLP to make gifts to S is not to secure a valuation discount.
(3) Rationale for the Primary Purpose Approach
Almost from the inception of the estate and gift tax laws, "fair market
value" has been the standard used for valuing property.216 This standard has
many advantages. It provides an objective measure of value and thus
eliminates the need to determine the subjective value of the property in the
hands of the transferee.217 Basing the tax on a property's subjective value to
the transferee is highly problematic; indeed, it is difficult to imagine how one
would go about determining this value. Moreover, given the amorphous
nature of that inquiry, disparate results among similarly situated taxpayers
would be inevitable. The "fair market value" standard has the further
advantage ofcapturing an indisputably important aspect ofa property's value:
the amount the owner can realize by selling it
Departure from the fair market value standard should therefore be made
only where there are strong and compelling reasons for doing so. It is
submitted that the principal purpose test proposed above provides a rational
basis for deviation from the fair market value standard.
First, the mere fact that a transaction is primarily tax motivated is a strong
indication that the gift's true value substantially exceeds its value as
determined under current law. The tax avoidance purpose in these cases is to
216. Thegift tax regulations adopted the ''fair market value"standard substantiallyin its present form
in 1924, and the estate regulations fonowed suit in 1926. Treas. Reg. 67, Art. 7(1),26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev.
1162,1166 (1924)(gift tax); Treas. Reg. 70, Art. 13(1),28 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 427,440 (1926)(estate
tax). However, the estate tax regulations had adopted the same concept in 1919, although in different
words. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 14, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 761 (1919)(stating the value to be used is
"market, or sale, value").
217. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
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transfer wealth without paying a tax on its full value. Therefore, the fact that
the taxpayer undertook the transaction primarily for tax purposes means that
he perceived that the true value ofthe gift exceeded the amount reportable for
tax purposes (i.e., the amount determined under the fair market value
standard). Furthermore, the fact that a tax-motivated taxpayer was willing to
pay the substantial "upfront" costs typically involved in these transactions
shows that he perceived the value escaping tax to be substantial.218
In contrast, there is no basis for inferring that the true value of the
transferred property exceeds its fair market value in a transaction where tax
avoidance is not the primary purpose. Consider Case I above where P
transferred a voting interest in the LLC toA, the child who had both the desire
and the competence to operate the family business, and a nonvoting interest
to D, who had neither the desire nor the competence to do so. These facts
simply provide no basis for inferring that the fair market value standard
undervalues D's interest. P wanted to vest operating control ofhis business
in competent hands, and he may have viewed the lowervalue ofD's nonvoting
interest as a real but unavoidable consequence of achieving this result.
Indeed, P's gifts have created a situation where conflict often occurs. A
will undoubtedly receive compensation for his services to the LLC, while D,
who is not actively involved in the business, will receive no compensation.
Since A's financial needs are being satisfied by his compensation, he may
prefer to plow the LLC's earnings back into the business while D, who
receives no compensation, will press for distribution ofthe LLC's earnings to
its members. In this case, A's control (and conversely, D's lack of control)
will have a clearly adverse effect on the value ofD's interest.
Recall Case II, in which P divided his business equally among his three
children. P's primary purpose in making this disposition was to treat his
children equally and not tax avoidance. Again, these facts provide no basis
for inferring that the true value ofeach child's interest exceeded the amount
as determined under the fair market value standard. The reduced value of
each child's interest because none of them possesses control may simply
reflect a real but unavoidable consequence ofP's dispositive plan.
The primarypurpose test also permits taxpayers to administer and deploy
their assets in the most efficient manner possible-without a tax penalty.
Most people would probably agree that, in general, it is a social good when
218. The Wall Street Journal reports that FLPs "dOll't come cheap" and "can cost anywhere from
about $5,000 to $30,000 to set up." Silverman, supra note 4.
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assets are employed in the most efficient manner possible.219 Some might
argue that the tax law should affirmatively encourage this objective while
others might argue that the tax law should be neutral, but almost everyone
would agree that the law 'should not discourage the efficient allocation of
resources. However, the aggregation approach may well produce this result.
Consider again Case I, in which P gave control ofhis business to A, who
had both the desire and competence to operate it, and a nonvoting interest to
B, who had neither. This result is a social good. It is socially desirable for
assets to be managed competently and socially undesirable for them to be
managed incompetently. The aggregation approach would discourage P from
undertaking his desirable plan, since it would overtax him on the value ofB's
nonvoting interest.220 As shown above, B's nonvoting interest is almost
certainly less valuable than A's voting interest, yet the aggregation approach
would treat both equally. Indeed, the aggregation approach would value B's
interest as though he participated in the control ofthe LLC, since his one-half
interest would be valued at one-half of a one hundred percent controlling
interest. In contrast, the primary purpose approach would not penalize-and
thus would not discourage-P from proceeding with his plan. Since P's
reasons for engaging in the transaction were primarily nontax, it would allow
a lack-of-control discount for B's nonvoting interest and thus recognize that
B's interest is less valuable than A's.
Since individuals attempt to optimize their situation, one may presume
that they will generally enter transactions that constitute the most efficient
utilization of their assets.22I However, this presumption is unjustified where
a taxpayer enters a transaction primarily to avoid taxes. Tax considerations
distort incentives and can lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. For
example, a taxpayer who, lured by the prospect of avoiding estate and gift
taxes, transfers her marketable securities to an FLP, will incur substantial
219. See RICHARD A POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that "most
people would probably agree" that efficiency defmed as the "allocation of resources in which value is
maximized" is "an important criterion" of social choice).
220. If the aggregation approach is adopted, the taxpayer could not escape its effect forever since
death is inevitable. However, he could delay its effect by holding onto his entire interest until death rather
than disposing of it during life. The pressure to hold onto property unti Ideath is increased when, as under
current law, gifts are taxed more severely than testamentary transfers. See supra notes 182-84 and
accompanying text. Delaying needed and desirable changes is, ofcourse, socially undesirable.
221. See POSNER, supra note 219, at 4 (describing as a basic assumption ofeconomics that man "is
a rational maximizer of his self interest"). Many have attacked this assumption of "rationality." [d.
§ 1.3-.4. Although Irecognize that irrationality plays a significant role in human decision making, I think
that the assumption that human beings generally act rationally provides a workable assumption for
detennining tax policy.
HeinOnline -- 1 Pitt. Tax Rev. 210 2003-2004
210 PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW [Vol. 1:155
costs in fonning and maintaining the FLP-eosts she would not have incurred
had she retained the securities.222 Thus, not only will the federal fisc be
cheated oftax revenue, but the taxpayerwill have expended and will continue
to expend money on transaction costs that economically could have been
better used elsewhere.
Another advantage of the "primary purpose" approach is that the courts,
the Service and taxpayer representatives are experienced in determining a
taxpayer's business (i.e., nontax) and tax avoidance purposes. Under the
"business purpose" and "economic substance" test, one must determine
whether the taxpayer had a bona fide business (i.e., nontax) purpose for
undertaking a transaction,m and in the case ofprovisions like § 269, one must
detennine whether the taxpayer's "principal purpose" was tax avoidance.
Indeed, the Code makes the taxpayer's "primary purpose" the basis for
detennining tax consequences· in at least 49 different instances.224
Detennining a taxpayer's primary purpose is difficult, but it appears to be a
more manageable test than determining the "true" value of a gift to the
recipient.
Some may find the primarypurpose approach objectionableon the ground
that the process of determining a taxpayer's primary purpose is excessively
expensive and time consuming. This is a significant concern. Nevertheless,
the primary purpose approach appears superior to its alternatives.
(a) The alternatives to the primary purpose test-as they have been
presented to dat~would either always allow a lack-of<ontrol discount to a
minority interest carved from a taxpayer's controlling interest, as under
current law, or always disallow it, as under the aggregation approach. Such
categorical approaches are less expensive to administer and may indeed be
justified where the vast overwhelming majority of cases fall in one category
or the other. However, as shown above, the cases under discussion do not
demonstrate the degree of uniformity that would justify a categorical
222. See supra note 218 concerning the substantial costs of fonning an FLP. Operating and
maintaining an FIl' will also entail substantial costs. FLPs require continuing skilled professional
oversight, since as partnerships they are subject to some of the most complex: tax provisions in existence.
There are many pitfalls that an FLP may fall into with adverse tax and nontax consequences. See Katherine
D. Black et aI., When a Discount Isn't a Bargain: Debunking the Myths Behind Family Limited
Partnerships, 32 U. MEM. L. REv. 245 (2002).
223. See generally David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle ofEconomic Substance, 52 TAX LAw.
235 (1999), and Smith, supra note 60, for an analysis and discussion of the "business purpose" and
"economic substance" tests.
224. Based on a Westlaw search made by the author on December 8,2003, ofthe phrase "principal
purpose" in the FI'X-USCA database.
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approach. There are many cases where a lack-of-control discount is
unjustified, many where it is justified, and many that fall somewhere in
between. Consequently, the demands ofjustice (i.e., judging each case on its
particular merits) outweigh the claim of administrative convenience.
(b) The prophylactic effect of the primary purpose approach will reduce
the costs. Ifthat approach is adopted, a large number oftaxpayers who, under
current law, would be tempted to employ an FLP, will refrain from doing so.
A taxpayer with a weak case under the primary purpose test would be unlikely
to employ the FLP technique, because he knows that its use will trigger an
expensive contest with the Service that he will almost surely lose. His
chances of success are especially poor because the proposed approach places
the burden ofproofon the taxpayer. Thus the number ofnewly-formed FLPs
(and the number of tax controversies involving them) is likely to drop
significantly under the proposed approach.
(c) Given the generous unified gift tax credit and the even more generous
unified estate tax credit, controversies over FLPs are likely to occur only in
cases of very large gifts and estates. Hence, the cost of determining the
taxpayer's purpose is likelyto be relatively small in comparison to the amount
of potential tax involved.
Some readers may be concerned that itwould be too easy for taxpayers
to avoid the transfer tax under the proposed approach simply by fabricating
nontax purposes for utilizing the FLP. However, placing the burden ofproof
on the taxpayer in establishing his primary purpose guards against this
possibility. Moreover, experience shows that courts examine a taxpayer's
purported purpose with a healthy dose of skepticism. Thus the court in
Strangi cursorily dismissed the three purported nontax reasons given for the
decedent's formation and use of the FLP.
The primary purpose approach is not perfect, principally because there is
no fixed relationship between the degree oftax avoidance in a transaction and
the amount of justifiable discount for lack· of control. Nevertheless, it
represents a significant improvement over current law and is superior to the
aggregation approach. The primary purpose approach strikes a pragmatic
compromise between the taxpayer and the Service: it prohibits taxpayers from
using FLPs primarily to reduce transfer taxes-the very cases where
undervaluation is likely to be especially egregious; it allows taxpayers to seek
socially beneficial solutions without the tax penalty of overvaluation; and it
protects the public from the loss oftax revenue in socially wasteful activities.
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(4) Special Rules for the Acquisition ofControl
Current law should be revised to eliminate the lack-of<ontrol discount
in the case ofa transfer that either confers control ofan entity upon the donee
or is made to a donee who already possesses control.
Consider the case previously discussed where A, who owned all one
hundred shares ofXYZ, Inc., gave 35 shares to her daughter D in Year One,
another 40 shares in Year Four and bequeathed the remaining 25 shares to D
when she died. Under current law, the gift of40 shares in Year Four and the
bequest of25 shares each qualifies for a lack-of<ontrol discount, because the
number of shares involved in each transfer, considered separately, lacks
control. Under the special rule proposed above, A's gift of 40 shares would
not qualify for the discount because it conferred control ofXYZ, Inc. on D,
and A's bequest would not qualify because it was made when D already
possessed control.
The results under current law cannot be justified, because they
substantially understate the actual value ofthe gift and bequest. A's gift of40
shares in Year Four increased D's stockholdings to a controlling interest.
Hence the value ofthat gift to D is much greater than ifshe had no stock in the
company. By virtue ofthat gift, D became entitled to all ofthe privileges and
benefits accruing to a controlling shareholder. Moreover, she can now sell the
gifted 40 shares without incurring a discount for lack of control. She can
achieve this result simply by selling the 40 shares together with a sufficient
quantity of her other XYZ, Inc. stock to give the buyer control.225 This
analysis also applies to A's bequest.
For purposes ofthe above special rule, control would be defined as more
than 50% ofthe combined voting power in the entity. All voting interests that
the transferee can sell or cause to be sold would be counted in applying this
rule. Thus, in addition to the voting interests the transferee actually owns,
voting interests that he has a legal right to obtain (e.g., under an option or
through the exercise of a general power ofappointment) and voting interests
he can cause to be sold (e.g., stock in a trust of which the transferee is sole
trustee) would be counted. The idea is that the lack-of<ontrol discount should
be disallowed whenever the transferee is in a position to transfer control.
225. The courts have recognized that when a taxpayer holds both controlling and noncontrolling
interests in a company, both interests must be valued as an in tegrated bundle, and consequently no discount
for lack ofcontrol can be allowed for the noncontrolling interest. Estate ofCurry v. United States, 706 F2d
1424, 1428 (7th Cir. 1983)
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Recall that A's initial gift of 35 shares to D qualified for a discount for
lack of control. However, D subsequently acquired control of the company
and thus became able to sell the 35 shares as part ofa control bloc. Should D
now be required to give back the benefit of that discount?
Such an approach can be justified by analogy to the Supreme Court's
reasoning in United States v. Tufts.226 That case involved the sale of real
property that was encumbered by nonrecourse debt.227 The Supreme Court
ruled that the sellers, in computing their gain on the sale, had to report the
entire remaining unpaid debt as part of the amount realized.228 The Court
reasoned that when the sellers·borrowed the money, they were allowed to
exclude it from income because it was assumed they would repay it.229
However, when they sold the property, it became clear they would never repay
the debt and thus the assumption that originallyjustified the debt's exclusion
from income turned out to be wrong. The Court held that this prior mistake
should now be rectified by treating the unpaid debt as part ofamount realized .
on the sale.230 Otherwise, the sellers would have received tax-free income.231
Similarly a lack-of-control discount was allowed on A's original 35
shares, because it was assumed that the stock interest was only a minority
interest and thus would be discounted by a prospective purchaser. However,
once D acquired control ofXYZ Inc., he became able to sell the 35 shares as
a part ofa control bloc. Thus the assumption that justified the discount ceased
to be true, and under the reasoning of United States v. Tufts, the discount
should no longer be allowed. This can be accomplished by treating the lack·
of-control discount previously allowed as a gift by A in the year that D
acquired control. (The gift tax on the recaptured discount will sometimes be
referred to hereafter as the "recapture tax.")
Unless such a rule is adopted, donors will continue to be able, by careful
sequencing of their gifts, to transfer control of an entity and yet have a
substantial portion of the value transferred qualify for a lack-of-control
discount. A donor may transfer LP interests representing 99% of the FLP's
entity to a child, and then in a year following these transfers, transfer the 1%
GP interest to the same child. Under current law, 99% of the FLP's equity
will qualify for a lack-of-control discount even though once the donee
226. 461 U.s. 300 (1983).
227. Id. at 301-02.
228. Id. at 317.
229. Id. at 309, 312.
230. Id. at 309.
231. Id. at 310.
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acquires control, he will be able to sell the LP interests wi$out discount by
selling them together with the 1% GP interest. The proposed rule would
prevent this result
Some may argue that the proposed recapture tax is inconsistent with the
nature of a transfer tax, since it is based on an event (i.e., the donee's
acquisition ofcontrol) that occurs after the affected interest has already been
transferred. This objection seems unwarranted. The recapture tax is
attributable to the original transfer of the affected interest; there is no tax
unless there is a transfer. It is not a tax on the mere ownership ofproperty, but
is attributable to an exercise of one of. the powers flowing from such
ownership, namely, the power to transfer the property. Moreover, the rule
calls only for a recapture of a discount allowed at the time of the transfer.
Thus it does not tax any appreciation occurring after the date of the transfer.
A number ofprovisions would be needed to implement the recapture tax
proposed above. First, a mechanism would be needed to assure that the
amount of the lack-of-control discount allowed could be determined. This
could be accomplished by requiring donors to set forth on the gift tax return
the amount ofany lack-of-control discount claimed. Ifthe Service challenges
the value of the gift and the controversy is settled, the taxpayer and the
Service would be required to designate the amount of the lack-of-control
discount allowed in the settlement. If the amount of the discount is
adjudicated, the court (or jury) would be required tospecify the amount ofthe
discount allowed.
As under current law, the Service sh()uld be permitted to collect the
recapture tax from the donee as well as the donor.232 This provision is
important because in many cases the donor will be deceased and his property
dispersed among numerous heirs or devisees, and thus collection of the tax
from the donor's transferees would be difficult. However, the Code should
grant the donee an explicit right to be reimbursed by the donor or the donor's
transferees for any recapture tax that he pays.233
The recapture tax should be limited to the lesser of the amount of the
lack-of-control discount previously allowed, or the amount by which the
property's value atthe time ofthe recapture exceeds the value previously used
in computing the donor's gift tax liability. This limitation would assure that
232. Current law imposes liability for the gift tax on the donor. LRC. § 2502(c). However, if the
donor does not pay the tax, the Service can collect the tax from the donee. ld. § 6324(b).
233. For similar provisions under current law in the case of the estate tax, see id. §§ 2206, 22078.
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the total amount taxed would never exceed the property's value at the date of
recapture.234
V. CONCLUSION
The FLP continues to be a viable tax saving device even after the Tax
Court's decision in Strangi. In many cases, use ofFLPs enables taxpayers to
transfer substantial amounts of value without such value being subject to
either a gift tax or an estate tax. Reformers have generally proposed either the
attribution approach or the aggregation approach to deal with this problem.
However, analysis of these proposals shows that they are overly broad and
will frequently tax gifts in excess of the value actually transferred.
This Article proposes that discounts be disallowed where the taxpayer's
primary purpose in using the FLP or other entity to make his transfers is to
secure a valuation discount. This proposal will strike at the cases where
undervaluation is most likely to be egregious. At the same time, it will allow
bona fide, socially desirable transfers to take place without being penalized by
overvaluation.
This Article further proposes that no lack-of-control discount should be
allowed when a gift either confers control of an entity on a donee or is made
when the donee already controls the entity. In addition, the Article proposes
that a lack-of-control discount previously allowed should be recaptured when
and if the donee subsequently acquires control of an entity. Unless these
provisions are adopted, taxpayers, by careful sequencing of their gifts, will
still be able to transfer control and yet qualify the bulk ofthe transferred value
for a lack-of-control discount
ADDENDUM-KIMBELL V. UNITED STATES
After the foregoing article was written, the Court ofAppeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court's decision in Kimbell v. United States.235
The court's sweeping opinion constitutes a stunning taxpayer victory and may
234. These rules may need to be reinforced by attribution rules. This should be done with care since
their purpose is to base the tax on clear, demonstrable economic power-not on speculations as to what
others may do. Perhaps a sensible compromise is to have only spousal attribution, just as the Treasury had
proposed in its recommendation ofan aggregation approach. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying
text.
235. Kimbell v. United States, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 9911 (5th Cir. May 20, 2004), rev'g 244 F.
Supp. 2d 700 (N.D. Tex. 2003) [hereinafter Kimbell II).
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eliminate the threat posedby the Strangi decision236 to the continuing viability
of the FLP.
At first blush, Kimbell appears to make it relatively easy for an estate to
show that the decedent's transfer ofproperty to an FLP was "a bona fide sale
for adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth" and thus to
come within the statutory exception to § 2036. If this is so, Kimbell renders
Strangi and many ofthe other cases discussed in this article largely irrelevant.
The focus ofthose cases was whether the decedent retained either the right to
the income from the transferred property (§ 2036(a)(l»237 or the right to
designate the person who will enjoy the property or the income therefrom
(§ 2036(a)(2».m But if the exception applies, the transferred property will
not be included in the decedent's gross income even if he retained such a
power or interest.
(1) Facts. In 1998, two months before her death, a revocable trust that
Mrs. Kimbell (the decedent) had previously established joined with her son
and daughter-in-law to form a limited liability company (LLC) in which the
trust took a 50% interest.239 Later in the same month, the LLC and
Mrs. Kimbell's revocable trust formed an FLP.240 The trust contributed
approximately "$2.5 million in cash, oil and gas working interests and royalty
interests, securities, notes, and other assets" for a 99% LP interest, while the
LLC contributed about $25,000 in cash for a 1% GP interest.241
Approximately eleven percent ofthe FLP's assets at its inception consisted of
oil and gas working interests and four percent consisted ofgas and oil royalty
interests.242
Mrs. Kimbell died in March of 1998 at the age of96.243 The estate valued
her LP interest in the FLP (which she owned through her revocable trust)244
236. Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 85 T.CM. (CCH) 1331, 2003 T.C.M.(RIA) 'll2003-145
[hereinafter Strangi II).
237. See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 140-68 and accompanying text.
239. Kimbell 11,2004 U.S. App. tEXIS 9911. at *2.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at *3.
243. Id. at *2.
244. Although the 99% LP interest in the FLP was owned by the trust rather than by the decedent,
it is treated for estate tax purposes as owned by her. This is because the decedent retained the power to
revoke the trust when she created it. LR.C. § 2038. Thus, the trust's LP interest will sometimes hereinafter
be referred to as the decedent's interest, and the trust's transfer of assets to the FLP will sometimes be
described as a transfer by the decedent .
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at $1.257 million while the IRS valued her interest at $2.463 million.24S The
difference in valuations resulted principally from the IRS's finding that
§ 2036(a) applied to her transfer ofassets to the FLP.246
The estate argued that the decedent's transfer ofassets to the FLP (via her
revocable trust) was not subject to § 2036(a) because it came within the
statutory exception for "a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth." The district court rejected this contention, but·
the court of appeals reversed and granted summary judgment to the estate.247 .
(2) What is a "bonafide sale"? Following several Tax Court decisions,
including Strangi, the district court held that Mrs. Kimbell's transfer to the
FLP (through her revocable trust) was not "a bona fide sale," because
Mrs. Kimbell "stood on both sides of the transaction"248 and because the
transaction was "nothing but a circuitous 'recycling' ofvalue."249 The court
noted that Mrs. Kimbell transferred her assets in exchange for a 99% interest
in the FLP (plus an additional 0.5% interest in the FLP through the LLC).2S0
Thus, she "stood on both sides ofthe transaction"-indeed ''was both sides of
the transaction."25I According to the district court, Mrs. Kimbell's retention
of a 99.5% interest in the transferred assets also demonstrated that there was
245. Kimbell v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702 (N.D. Tex. 2003), rev~d, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9911 (5th Cir. May 20, 2004) [hereinafter Kimbell/].
246. Apparently, another-but subsidiary-reason for the difference in thevaluationswas the estate's
contention that Mrs. Kimbell had received only an "assignee" interest rather than an LP interest in the FLP.
KimbellII, 2004 U.S. App.lEXIS 9911, at *36 (5th Cir. May 20, 2004) (remanding case to district court
to determine whether decedent's interest was an assignee interest or an LP interest).
However, the difference in the valuations was primarily due to the parties' disagreement on whether
§ 2036(a) applied. The estate contended that § 2036(a) did not apply and hence the interest to be valued
was Mrs. Kimbell's interest in the FLP. Id. at *5-*6. In valuing that interest, the estate claimed a 49%
discount for lack ofcontrol and lack of marketability. Id. The Service, on the other hand, contended that
§ 2036(a) did apply and thus the interests to be valued were the assets Mrs. Kimbell had transferred to the·
FLP and not her LP interest; the Service apparently did not allow any discount in valuing those assets. Id.
247. Id. at *36.
248. Kimbel/I, 244 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (N.D. Tex., 2003),rev'd, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 9911 (5th
Cir. May 20, 2004) (citing Estate of Harper v. COOIm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA)
'\I 2002-121, at 722-24 (2002»; see also Strangi II, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1343, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA)
'\12003-145, at 746 (stating that "decedent essentially stood on both sides of the transaction").
249. Kimbell1,244 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (citing Estate of Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641,
1653,2002 T.C.M. (RIA) '\12002-121, at 722-24). Similar holdings and language appear in Estate of
Thompson v. Commissioner, 84 T.CM. (CCH) 374,387-89,2002 T.CM. (RIA) '\12002-246, at 1525-27
(describing transfer to an Fll' as "mere 'recycling ofvalue''') and in Strangi II, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1344,
2003 T.C.M. (RIA) '\12003-145, at 746 (describing transfers to an FLP and a corporation as "merely a
'recycling' of value through partnership or corporate solution").
250. Kimbell 1,244 F. Supp. 2d at 705 (stating that decedent owned "99% of the Partnership, and
an additional 0.5% of the Partnership through her 50% interest in the LLC).
251. Id. at 704.
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no real change in her relationship to the assets and that the "transfer" was
merely a "circuitous 'recycling' ofvalue.',m The district court also relied on
the definition of "arm's-length" in Black's Law Dictionary as pertaining to
dealings "between two parties who are not related or not on close terms. ,,253
The court of appeals, relying on one of its prior decisions, rejected the
notion that a transaction between related parties could never be "a bona fide
sale."2S4 Although it conceded that a transfer between family members
required "heightened scrutiny," it held that a transaction that is "a bona fide
sale between strangers must also be bona fide between members of the same
family.',m The court held that a transaction would be considered "bona fide"
ifit was made for "adequate and full consideration" (discussed below) and in
"good faith. "256 The court apparently felt that the "good faith" requirement
imposed only a minimal burden on the taxpayer. The court noted that a
"transaction motivated solely by tax planning with no business or corporate
purpose is nothing more than a contrivance that is rightly ignored for purposes
ofthe tax computation."257 Later in the opinion, the court stated that a transfer
for "adequate and full consideration"-even between related
parties--eonstitutes a "bona fide sale" unless the "evidence demonstrates the
absence of good faith, i.e., a sham transaction motivated solely by tax
avoidance."258 The court specifically held that "tax planning motives do not
prevent a sale from being 'bona fide' ifthe transaction is otherwise real, actual
or genuine."259
The court of appeals found that the transfer in Kimbell was a "bona fide
sale" based on the following considerations, among others:
(a) Mrs. Kimbell held back sufficient assets from the FLP to support hersel( and there
was no commingling of the FLP's assets and her personal assets.260
(b) Partnership formalities were observed and the assetS contributed to the FLP were
actually transferred to it?61 .
252. Id. at 704-05.
253. Id. at 704 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 103 (7th ed. 1999».
254. Kimbell II, 2004 U.S. App. tEXIS 9911, at-15 (5th Cir. May 202004) (citing Wheeler v.
United States, 116 F.3d 749,764-65 (5th Cir. 1997».
255. Id.
256. Id. at -14--16.
257. Id. at -16 (emphasis added).
258. Id. at -24 (emphasis added).
259. Id. at -16.
260. Kimbell II, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 9911, at -26 (5th Cir.May 20 2004).
261. Id. at -27.
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(c) The assets contributed to the FLPincluded working interests in oil and gas
properties that required active management.262 Presumably, the court considered
this factor important, because the FLP fonnat pennitted unified management of
an active business even though it was owned by multiple parties. This objective
would not be so important if the assets merely consisted of passive investments.
(d) The limited liability provided by a limited partnership was crucial to Mrs. Kimbell
because she was investing as a working interest owner in oil and gas properties
and could be held personally liable for any environmental damage that occurred
in the operation of the properties. 263
(e) Mrs. Kimbell wanted to keep the oil and gas properties intact beyond her lifetime
rather than subdivide them by distributions to subsequent generations. Keeping
the properties together in a limited partnership (i) reduced accounting costs,
(ii) avoided the costs of recording transfers of the properties as they passed from
one generation to another, and (iii) preserved the properties as "separate property"
in the hands ofher descendants thereby protecting such interests from division in
the event of divorce.264
(3) What is "adequate and full consideration"? Relying on one of its
prior decisions,265 the court of appeals held that there is "adequate and full
consideration" if"the asset the estate receives [is] roughly equivalent to the
asset it gave up."266 The Service argued that it was "inconsistent for the estate
to assert, on the one hand, that the value of Mrs. Kimbell's interest in the
Partnership is worth only 50% ofthe asserts she transferred (as discounted for
lack of control and marketability),. and on the other hand claim that the
partnership interest Mrs. Kimbell received in exchange for the assets
transferred was adequate and full consideration for the transfer."267
The court of appeals rejected this contention:
The business decision to exchange cash or other assets for a transfer-restricted, non-
managerial interest in a limited partnership involves fmancial considerations other than
the purchaser's ability to turn right around and sell the newly acquired limited
partnership interest for [one hundred] cents on the dollar. Investors who acquire such
interests do so with 1he expectation of realizing benefits such as management expertise,
security and preservation of assets; capital appreciation and avoidance of personal
liability. Thus there is nothing inconsistent in acknowledging, on the one hand, that the
investor'sdollars have acquired a limited partnership interest at arm's length for adequate
and full consideration and, on the other hand, that the asset thus acquired has a present
fair market value, i.e., immediate sale potential, ofsubstantially less than the dollars just
paid[,] a classic informed trade-otT.168 . .
262. [d.
263. [d. at *28-"'29.
264. [d. at *29. See id. at *3·*4 for me business purpoSes set forth in the partnership agreement.
265. Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 1997).
266. Kimbell II, 2004 U.S. App. I.EXlS 9911, at *12.
267. [d. at *22.
268. [d. at *23-"'24.
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The court then summarized its position on this issue as follows:
The proper focus therefore on whether a transfer to a partnership is for adequate and full
consideration is: (I) whether the interests credited to each of the partners was
.proportionate to the fair market value of the assets each partner contributed to the
partnership, (2) whelher the assets contributed by each partner to the partnership were
properly credit~d to the respective capital accounts ofthe partners, and (3) whether on
termination or dissolution ofthe partnership the partners were entitled to distributions
from the partnership in amounts equal to their respective capital accounts.269
(4) What are the implications ofKimbell?" The Kimbell decision will
undoubtedly be hailed as a great taxpayer victory that removes the threats to
the continuing viability of the FLP posed by the Strangi decision. Caution,
however, is advisable.
A surprising result of Kimbell may be to resuscitate the "business
purpose" test that the Tax Court seemed to put to rest in Strangi. 270 A finding
of "business purpose" (more accurately, a nontax purpose)· served two
purposes for the Kimbell court: (1) it helped establish that Mrs. Kimbell's
transfer to the LFP was a "bona fide sale";271 and (2) it helped establish that
what she received in her transfer to the FLP (i.e., her LP interest) was
"roughly equivalent" to the assets she transferred to the FLP, and thus
constituted"adequate and full consideration."272 The court acknowledged that
the "fair market value" (i.e., the immediate resale value) of the properties
Mrs. Kimbell transferred to the FLP greatly exceeded the "fair market value"
of the LP interest she received in return, but asserted that this apparent
"deficit" in consideration was made up by "benefits such as management
expertise, security and preservation of assets, capital appreciation[,] and
avoidance of personal liability."273
The Kimbell court, fmding that the "government [had] raised no material
issues of fact to counter the taxpayer's evidence that the Partnership was
entered into for substantial business reasons," granted summary judgment to
the taxpayer.274 The result conceivablycould be different inStrangi where the
269. /d. at ·24.
270. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478, 484-87, aff'd on this issue sub nom. Gulig v.
Comm'r, 293 F.3d 279, (5th Cir. 2(02) [hereinafter Strangi 1].
271. Kimbell 1/,2004 U.S. App. IEXlS 9911, at *26-·30.
272. /d. at ·12.
273. /d. at ·22-*24
274. /d. at ·32··33 (emphasis added).
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Tax Court expressed great skepticismthat any ofthe purported nontax reasons
for forming the FLP was genuine.275
The ultimate impact ofKimbell may therefore tum on how rigorously the
courts apply the "business purpose" requirement. There are certainly
statements in the opinion, quoted above, from which one may infer that the
presence of any business purpose will suffice to satisfy this requirement.276
If so, it will be relatively easy for taxpayers to escape the clutches of
§ 2036(a), at least in the Fifth Circuit. However, given the court's finding that
the FLP in Kimbell was formed "for substantial business purposes,"277 such
statements must be regarded as dicta. As with most decisions, the impact of
Kimbell will be known only as it is applied in future cases.
275. Strangi I, 115 T.C. at 485-86 (stating that "[w]e agree with respondent that there are reasons to
be skeptical about the nontax motives for fonning [the FlP]"). Strangi may also be distinguished from
Kimbell on the ground that some of the assels transferred in Kimbell consisted ofworking interests in oil
and gas properties that required active management, Kimbell II, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 9911, at *27, while
the assels transferred in Strangi consisted of"only monetary or investment assets," Strangi II, 85 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 1342, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) "d 2003-145, at 744.
276. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
277. Kimbell II, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 9911, at *32·*33.
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